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Emergency Power and the Militia Acts
The accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day. It
does come, however slowly, from the generative force of
unchecked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the most
disinterested assertion of authority.1
INTRODUCTION
Terrorist cells in Brooklyn carry out an escalating series of terrorist
attacks on New York City over the course of several weeks. After the third
such attack, which destroys the FBI's New York headquarters and kills
hundreds, the President declares a state of martial law in Brooklyn, imposes
a curfew, rounds up individuals of Middle Eastern descent, and subjects the
borough's two-million-plus residents to harsh, restrictive military rule-
including the torture of several suspects-until the remaining cells are
hunted down and destroyed. Borrowed from the eerily prescient 1998
movie The Siege,2 this scenario raises some extraordinarily serious and
difficult legal questions.
Among them, what are the limits of such executive military authority,
insofar as both time and scope of power are concerned? Are there any? Can
there be any? What role can courts, if they are even open, play during such
a crisis? What remedy is there for violations of whatever constitutional
mandates still apply? Who gets to say when the crisis is over? Most
importantly, where would we start, the morning after, in trying to answer
these questions, or even in trying to pose them?
Many contemporary scholars argue either that most emergency powers
described above are inherently executive (because they follow from the
Vesting Clause, the Oath Clause, the Commander-in-Chief Clause, or the
Take Care Clause)3 or are extraconstitutional (i.e., they apply when the
Constitution does not).4 Invoking the specter of Jefferson
5 or Lincoln,6
1. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
2. THE SIEGE (20th Century Fox 1998); see also Kirk L. Davies, The Imposition of Martial
Law in the United States, 49 A.F. L. REV. 67, 111 (2000) (invoking The Siege as a hypothetical).
3. For a summary of this argument, see DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION 127-29
(2003). See also Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 38-61 (1993) (detailing the evolution of this theory of presidential authority).
4. See, e.g., Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 10 11, 1096-133 (2003). See generally George Winterton, The
Concept of Extra-Constitutional Executive Power in Domestic Affairs, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. I
(1979) (providing an overview of the theory and its origins).
These arguments are closely aligned with arguments in favor of "constitutional dictatorship."
As Martin Sheffer puts it, "Occasionally, the Constitution must be suspended so that it might not
be permanently destroyed. If this means that some form of constitutional dictatorship is inevitable,
in order for the nation to survive and then continue as a democracy after the emergency is over, so
be it." Martin S. Sheffer, Does Absolute Power Corrupt Absolutely? Part I. A Theoretical Review
of Presidential War Powers, 24 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 233, 246-47 (1999) (emphasis and
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many writers today seem content with the assumption that, whether such
authority is extraconstitutional, there is little question that the bulk of
emergency power belongs exclusively to the Executive, and that the
Constitution, to whatever degree it speaks to the issue, does not suggest
otherwise.7 Lost in this ongoing exchange about the government's crisis
authority, however, are two basic questions: What emergency powers does
the Constitution actually provide, and in which branches are they vested?
8
This Note takes up these questions in the specific context of a vital
subset of emergency powers: the power to use military force in responding
to domestic crises, including the imposition of martial law. It suggests that
the contemporary understanding, at least insofar as it holds that most
constitutional emergency powers belong to the Executive, fails to account
for this important area. Specifically, the Note argues that this subset of
presidential emergency power is traceable to a series of statutes passed by
Congress in 1792, 1795, 1807, 1861, and 1871.9 These "Militia Acts,"
footnotes omitted); see also CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS
GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES 288-314 (1948).
5. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in 11 THE WORKS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 146 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905) ("To lose our country by a scrupulous
adherence to written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those
who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means."), quoted in Jules
Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1393 (1989).
6. As Lincoln famously asked Congress with regard to the Suspension Clause, "[A]re all the
laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?"
Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421,430 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
7. See, e.g., PAUL SCHOTr STEVENS, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, U.S. ARMED
FORCES AND HOMELAND DEFENSE: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 4-8 (2001); Robert J. Delahunty &
John C. Yoo, The President's Constitutional Authority To Conduct Military Operations Against
Terrorist Organizations and the Nations That Harbor or Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 487, 488-89, 515-17 (2002). For a recent examination of martial law largely overlooking
questions as to its source, see Jason Collins Weida, Note, A Republic o] Emergencies: Martial
Law in American Jurisprudence, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1397 (2004).
8. In the most recent colloquy over emergency power, these issues were brushed aside.
Compare Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004) [hereinafter
Ackerman, Emergency Constitution], and Bruce Ackerman, This Is Not a War, 113 YALE L.J.
1871 (2004). with David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution 's Blind
Spot, 113 YALE L.J. 1753 (2004), and Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick 0. Gudridge, The Anti-
Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1801 (2004). The exchange between these scholars is
instructive, both for the extent to which they grapple with poignant questions about emergencies
facing Western democracies after September 11, and also for the surprisingly little attention they
give to any arguments about constitutional structure and where Ackerman's proposal would fit in.
9. The five statutes are the Calling Forth Act of 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264 (repealed 1795); the
Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424 (repealed in part 1861 and current version at 10 U.S.C. §§
331-335 (2000)); the Insurrection Act of 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443 (current version at 10 U.S.C. §§
331-335 (2000)); the Suppression of the Rebellion Act of 1861, ch. 25, 12 Stat. 281 (current
version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-335 (2000)); and specific parts of the Ku Klux Klan (Civil Rights)
Act of 1871, ch. 22, §§ 3-4, 17 Stat. 13, 14-15 (expired in part 1873 and current version at 10
U.S.C. § 333). Though each of the statutes is known by a host of different names, I use these
names, the most common form for each, throughout this Note, and I refer to them collectively as
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enacted largely pursuant to Congress's authority under the First Militia
Clause "[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions, '" delegated broad
swaths of emergency power to the President, especially the power to
impose martial law and suspend the writ of habeas corpus during serious
internal crises.
As the Note demonstrates, early practice and what little relevant case
law there is further bear out this thesis. Although this body of constitutional
emergency power today belongs to the Executive, it is not because of the
constitutional authority provided by Article 1I, but rather because of
congressional delegation. Though the separate issue of extraconstitutional
emergency power is beyond the scope of this Note, it bears emphasizing
that the history this Note traces suggests that, though the time may come
when some heretofore unforeseeable crisis or disaster requires resort to
extraconstitutional measures, it hasn't yet.
To be clear, the argument is not that all (or even most) emergency
power is traceable to the Militia Acts; over time, Congress has enacted
hundreds of statutes specifically meant to prescribe-or proscribe-various
types of crisis authority, and most have little or nothing to do with the
military.1 But the power to suspend civil law and impose martial rule is
undoubtedly among the most serious and drastic measures the government
can take in an emergency, and to the extent that this Note demonstrates how
even this extreme type of crisis authority is textually and historically
committed to Congress, it no doubt informs arguments about the
constitutional sources of other, lesser forms of emergency power.
An obvious question at the outset is why the constitutional source of
such power should matter to modem scholars if Congress has delegated
nearly all of its authority in this particular area to the President. The answer
is threefold: First, because this immensely significant form of emergency
power is legislative, Congress can by statute regulate and circumscribe its
limits-what Congress giveth, Congress can surely taketh away. Whatever
infirmities there may be with the current statutory regime governing such
crisis authority-and this Note suggests there are several-Congress can,
and indeed should, address them through appropriate legislation.
the "Militia Acts," even though the name is a bit of a misnomer, especially after 1807. See infra
notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15; see also Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 382-86
(1918) (discussing the First and Second Militia Clauses); Frederick Bernays Wiener, The Militia
Clause of the Constitution, 54 HARV. L. REV. 181 (1940) (same).
11. For a partial survey of these statutes, see SPECIAL COMM. ON NAT'L EMERGENCIES &
DELEGATED EMERGENCY POWERS, A RECOMMENDED NATIONAL EMERGENCIES ACT, S. REP.
No. 93-1170, at 2-3 (1974). See also infra notes 183-188 and accompanying text.
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Second, the fact that the Constitution vests even the power to impose
martial law in Congress calls into serious question presidential claims to
broad unilateral power during emergencies. Thus, in order to preserve the
structural allocation of emergency powers envisaged by the Founders and
early Congresses, courts must subject independent actions presidents
undertake in emergencies to exceptionally rigid scrutiny to determine
whether Congress has provided authorization. The most prominent
contemporary example of this is the Padilla case, where, leaving aside
procedural issues, 12 the debate centered on whether the President has
constitutional authority to hold a U.S. citizen suspected of terrorist ties and
detained on U.S. soil without being charged, or whether statutory
authorization is necessary and, if so, whether it is present.
1 3
Finally, the notion that the Constitution, via the First Militia Clause and
various other provisions, vests broad emergency military power in Congress
to delegate as it sees fit calls into question the arguments of many modem
scholars of emergency, and it suggests that our traditional assumptions
about governmental crisis authority in the United States took a wrong turn
sometime in the past. The questions are when, and why?
The Note begins in Part I with the Founding and the statutes, tracing the
role of Congress in legislating military emergencies from what the Framers
intended in 1787 to how Congress asserted itself in the Acts passed in 1792,
1795, 1807, 1861, and 1871. In recounting the history of and interplay
between these five statutes, Part I shows that the Founders and early
Congresses agreed that the Constitution gives most authority over military
emergencies to the legislature, to delegate at its discretion.
In Part II, the Note turns to the evolution of conceptions of emergency
power in both the executive branch and the judiciary. Centering on the four
nineteenth-century Supreme Court decisions that prominently discussed the
question of emergency power, 14 Part II demonstrates that the early Court,
12. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
13. See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev'd on other grounds, 124 S. Ct.
2711. For a survey of the issues arising out of the detention of U.S. citizens as "enemy
combatants," see Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, The Detention Power, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 153
(2004). See also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2653-59 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment). In his Hamdi opinion, Justice Souter
suggested that "in a moment of genuine emergency, when the Government must act with no time
for deliberation, the Executive may be able to detain a citizen if there is reason to fear he is an
imminent threat to the safety of the Nation and its people." Id. at 2659. But as Justice Scalia
argued, any emergency detention power must come through congressional suspension of habeas,
see id. at 2664-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting), and this Note suggests that in a true military emergency,
the suspension of the writ is necessarily part of martial law, which Congress, through the Militia
Acts, has given the President the power to impose.
14. The four cases on which Part II's analysis heavily relies are Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 19 (1827); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849); the Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2
Black) 635 (1863); and Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
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and most early presidents, viewed the power to call out the militia as a
major aspect of emergency power generally and often spoke of one when
invoking the other. Particularly in its decisions in these landmark
nineteenth-century cases, the Supreme Court repeatedly reaffirmed that the
President's authority to impose martial law is constitutional and that it
comes directly from the Militia Acts. As Part II concludes, even one of the
two cases most commonly cited for the proposition that the President
possesses broad, "inherent" emergency power 5 more properly fits into
this regime.
Finally, in Part III, the Note examines why academics have overlooked
the importance of the Militia Acts. Several prominent scholars of
presidential power in the mid-twentieth century, most notably Edward
Corwin and Charles Fairman, examined the Militia Acts but failed to
account fully for their import.16 But in contrast to Corwin and Fairman, who
at least acknowledged the potential relevance of the Militia Acts, most
contemporary scholars of emergency power have ignored these statutes and
their important contribution to our understanding of the constitutional
dynamic. ' 7 Restoring the role of the Militia Acts to this debate is the central
project of this Note.
For obvious reasons, emergency power has once again returned to the
forefront of the American legal academy, as scholars attempt to flesh out
the nature and extent of the government's authority during crises, terrorism
related and otherwise. 18 Though emergencies have always been a popular
topic for constitutional scholars, it has been decades since the last
significant wave of academic writing on the topic and sixty years since the
most comprehensive works were written. Part III concludes that, because of
small but significant misreadings by Corwin and his disciples, much has
been forgotten about the constitutional sources of governmental crisis
authority during the quiet years of this debate. It is unquestionably
15. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895); Cunningham v. Neagle (In re Neagle), 135 U.S. 1
(1890).
16. The principal works on which this Note's analysis relies are EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE
PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1948 (3d rev. ed. 1948), and CHARLES FAIRMAN, THE
LAW OF MARTIAL RULE (2d ed. 1943). Corwin's work has since undergone two additional
revisions, but this Note relies on the 1948 edition because his arguments on relevant points have
not changed materially in either of the subsequent editions.
17. The exception among modem acid'mics is Daniel Farber, who openly acknowledges the
Militia Acts in his discussion of Lincoln's actions during the Civil War. See, e.g., FARBER, supra
note 3, at 162-63. But as Part III suggests, Farber makes many of Corwin's missteps in misreading
the Prize Cases and thus fails to acknowledge the importance and centrality of the Militia Acts.
18. See, e.g., Symposium, Civil Liberties in a Time of Terror, 2003 WiS. L. REV. 253; Jules
Lobel, The War on Terrorism and Civil Liberties, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 767 (2002); sources cited
supra note 8; cf Oren Gross, Providing for the Unexpected: Constitutional Emergency
Provisions, in 33 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 13 (Yoram Dinstein & Fania Domb
eds., 2004) (surveying various foreign emergency provisions).
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important, going forward, to remember the extent to which the Constitution
gives Congress this important emergency power. But this Note concludes
that it is equally important for Congress to delineate adequately the scope of
the President's broad power to use the military in responding to
emergencies, and to do so before, rather than after, the next crisis.
I. THE FIRST MILITIA CLAUSE AND THE MILITIA ACTS
This Part introduces the Militia Acts by situating them in their proper
context, beginning with the debates at the Philadelphia Convention over the
scope and extent of domestic military crisis authority. After surveying the
competing interests present at Philadelphia, the crux of this Part examines
the background and language of the Militia Acts-enacted in 1792, 1795,
1807, 1861, and 1871-which regulated the circumstances in which the
President can use troops to respond to domestic crises. Taken together, this
history suggests the extent to which these statutes manifested Congress's
intent to use the First Militia Clause and Congress's other Article I, Section
8 powers as the major vehicles for bestowing significant emergency power
upon the Executive. As this Part concludes, reading the statutes side by side
yields significant conclusions about the nature of the delegation of power
and the extent to which much of its exercise was left open to judicial
interpretation and executive discretion.
A. The Constitution and Emergency Power
The Constitution as drafted unquestionably created military crisis
authority but carefully policed its source and potential operation, largely in
response to the fears of a powerful army that dominated the Philadelphia
Convention. Although many local and state militias had played important
roles in colonial America and during the Revolutionary War, 19 it was
commonly believed that a strong national army would pose a dangerous
and potentially insurmountable threat to the autonomy and authority of the
states within the fledgling Republic. 20 Notwithstanding this tension, it
became clear that, under the Articles of Confederation, the lack of
19. See RICHARD H. KOH-IN, EAGLE AND SWORD: THE FEDERALISTS AND THE CREATION OF
THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1783-1802, at 1-13 (1975).
20. ROBERT W. COAKLISY, THE ROLE OF FEDERAL MILITARY FORCES IN DOMESTIC
DISORDERS, 1789-1878, at 3 (1988); see also FREDERICK T. WILSON, FEDERAL AID IN DOMESTIC
DISTURBANCES: 1787-1903, S. DOc. No. 57-209, at 16 (2d Sess. 1903). This Note owes a
substantial debt to the efforts of Wilson and of Coakley, whose work served largely "to update
Wilson." COAKLEY, supra, at vii; see also CLAYTON D. LAURIE & RONALD H. COLE, THE ROLE
OF FEDERAL MILITARY FORCES IN DOMESTIC DISORDERS, 1877-1945 (1997).
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centralized federal control over the disparate armed bands had become
untenable. As Alan Hirsch summarized,
Under the Articles, the states retained the power to train and equip
the militias and to appoint most officers, whereas Congress could
raise troops by requisitioning each state for its proportionate quota
of men. There was no way for Congress to force state cooperation,
and such cooperation was often not forthcoming. The framers of
the Constitution were conscious of the inadequacy of the military
system and sought to redress it.
2 1
The central point of contention at Philadelphia over the militia was not
the scope of the militia's authority, but who would be responsible for
invoking it. 22 Questions of federalism dominated, as the Framers debated
"the extent of power the federal government and the states, respectively,
would and should have over the militia., 23 Most everyone at the
Convention dreaded a powerful standing army, and nearly as many feared a
central, dominant Chief Executive. The consensus thus clearly favored
vesting the primary responsibility for responding to threats in the militias of
the several states, though the federal government-through Congress, not
the President-would exercise ultimate control. 4
Yet, there was no articulated concern, either at Philadelphia or in any of
the ratification debates, over the three broad circumstances in which the
Clause gave Congress the authority to call forth the militia-executing the
laws, suppressing insurrections, and repelling invasions.25 The Framers
understood that there would be occasions requiring resort to extraordinary
measures that they themselves could not fully delineate. The crucial issue
was in which branch they would vest this critical discretion.
Finally, because of the fears of a standing army, the broad power the
Framers conferred upon Congress did not explicitly include the power to
use the regular army in internal emergencies. It wasn't that such power was
21. Alan Hirsch, The Militia Clauses of the Constitution and the National Guard, 56 U. CIN.
L. REv. 919, 923 (1988) (citations omitted).
22. See COAKLEY, supra note 20, at 7 ("[T]he right of the federal government... to use
military force in domestic disorders was not a subject of extended debate in the Constitutional
Convention. With few exceptions the convention delegates accepted the premise that the new
national government must possess a coercive power that the Confederation had lacked .... ").
23. Hirsch, supra note 21, at 924. For a summary of the debates, see Patrick Todd Mullins,
Note, The Militia Clauses, the National Guard, and Federalism: A Constitutional Tug of War, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 328,330-32 (1988). See also H. RICHARD UVILLER & WILLIAM G. MERKEL,
THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT FELL SILENT 72-78
(2002).
24. See S. DOC. NO. 57-209, at 16; see also COAKLEY, supra note 20, at 12 ("[T]he military
clauses of the Constitution were hammered out in a debate in which the opposition to peacetime
standing armies and to federal control over the militia asserted itself strongly.").
25. See Hirsch, supra note 21, at 926.
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left to the President; rather, "no power to use regular forces in domestic
disorders was explicitly granted to either the president or Congress," which
was "testimony to the fear of standing armies that pervaded the meeting. 26
The Convention voted down an amendment by George Mason that would
have added a preface to the First Militia Clause expressing the fear of
standing armies but permitting their use in certain situations. As Justice
Jackson would later note, the First Militia Clause's "limitation on the
command power, written at a time when the militia rather than a standing
army was contemplated as the military weapon of the Republic,
underscores the Constitution's policy that Congress, not the Executive,
should control utilization of the war power as an instrument of domestic
policy. '28 At least initially, the consensus was that the President was to have
a role in exercising emergency power, but primarily as "Commander in
Chief... of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual
Service of the United States.,
29
In sum, one of the Framers' dominant concerns was the federal
government's ability to defend itself (and, as manifested in the Guarantee
Clause, the several states 30). In addition to the power to declare war on
foreign enemies (which the Constitution also vested in Congress, but which,
as has been well documented, has eroded somewhat over time 31), the
Constitution, via the First Militia Clause, also gave the government the
power to use the militia to defend itself from threats both foreign and
domestic. As Justice Jackson would later write, the Framers "knew what
emergencies were, knew the pressures they engender for authoritative
action, knew, too, how they afford a ready pretext for usurpation. We may
also suspect that they suspected that emergency powers would tend to
kindle emergencies."32 Given this suspicion, the issue confronting early
Congresses was how to delegate the broad authority conferred on Congress
by the First Militia Clause.33
26. COAKLEY, supra note 20, at 14 (emphasis added).
27. See id. at 14-19.
28. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 644 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 29, at 185-87 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (suggesting that the militia, and not the regulars, were the more
reliable force in an emergency, and therefore the more appropriate body to exercise emergency
power).
29. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
30. Id. art. IV, § 4.
31. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF
VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993).
32. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 650 (Jackson, J., concurring).
33. See UVILLER & MERKEL, supra note 23, at 77 (suggesting that the Clause was meant to
be broadly delegated-the President would not have to wait around "like the early Stuarts" for
Congress's approval to respond to military crises).
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B. "Calling Forth" the State Militias: The 1792 and 1795 Militia Acts
On May 2, 1792, the Second Congress temporarily delegated its
authority under the First Militia Clause by passing a statute "to provide for
calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress
insurrections and repel invasions." 34 Recall from above that the First Militia
Clause empowered Congress to provide for the calling forth of the militia in
three circumstances: to execute the laws of the union, to suppress
insurrections, and to repel invasions.35 In final form, section 1 of the 1792
Calling Forth Act, which met with very little debate,36 covered the latter
two circumstances, providing
[t]hat whenever the United States shall be invaded, or be in
imminent danger of invasion from any foreign nation or Indian
tribe, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, to call
forth such number of the militia of the state or states most
convenient to the place of danger or scene of action, as he may
judge necessary to repel such invasion, and to issue his orders for
that purpose, to such officer or officers of the militia as he shall
think proper; and in case of an insurrection in any state, against the
government thereof, it shall be lawful for the President of the
United States, on the application of the legislature of such state, or
of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) to call
forth such number of the militia of any other state or states, as may
be applied for, or as he may judge sufficient to suppress such
insurrection.37
Section 2, which dealt with the first circumstance under which
Congress was constitutionally entitled to provide for the calling forth of the
militia, met with much firmer resistance.38 After long exchanges on the
House floor centering on the types of laws the President could call forth the
militia to execute, various amendments were added, including one requiring
34. Calling Forth Act of 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264, 264 (repealed 1795). Congress had twice
previously given President Washington specific authority to call out the militia to protect settlers
on the frontier. See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 10, § 16, 1 Stat. 119, 121 (repealed 1795); Act of
Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, § 5, 1 Stat. 95, 96 (expired 1790). For a discussion of the First Congress
and the problems faced on the frontiers, see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS:
THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801, at 85-87 (1997).
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
36. See David E. Engdahl, Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution: The Law and History of Military
Troops in Civil Disorders, 57 IOWA L. REV. 1,44 (1971).
37. Calling Forth Act of 1792 § 1, 1 Stat. at 264.
38. See Engdahl, supra note 36, at 44 ("From the record of the House debate, it appears that
the Representatives were not troubled over the use of the militia in circumstances so grave as
invasion or outright insurrection; but they were deeply concerned over the prospect of troops
being used in common civilian situations 'to execute the laws of the Union."').
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judicial intervention and a second mandating that the President first order
the insurgents to disperse. 39 As the final text provided,
[W]henever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the
execution thereof obstructed, in any state, by combinations too
powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial
proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by this act, the
same being notified to the President of the United States, by an
associate justice or the district judge, it shall be lawful for the
President of the United States to call forth the militia of such state
to suppress such combinations, and to cause the laws to be duly
executed. And if the militia of a state, where such combinations
may happen, shall refuse, or be insufficient to suppress the same, it
shall be lawful for the President, if the legislature of the United
States be not in session, to call forth and employ such numbers of
the militia of any other state or states most convenient thereto, as
may be necessary, and the use of militia, so to be called forth, may
be continued, if necessary, until the expiration of thirty days after
the commencement of the ensuing session.4°
In contrast to section 1, section 2 allowed the use of militia from
another state only when Congress was out of session-were Congress
around, presumably, the President would have to go to the legislature for a
more specific authorization.
Finally, after providing guidelines for the governance of the militia
once called forth, the Second Congress made its delegation temporary,
providing "[t]hat this act shall continue and be in force, for and during the
term of two years, and from thence to the end of the next session of
Congress thereafter, and no longer. '41 The Act was meant to be a three-
year-long experiment, but a broad one at that.42
Two years after the enactment of the Calling Forth Act, President
Washington relied exclusively on the Act in suppressing the Whiskey
Rebellion in western Pennsylvania. Though the Act had been invoked
before,43 the Whiskey Rebellion was "[t]he great precedent for the use of
federal military force in internal disturbances," 4 and it illustrates the extent
39. See id. at 45-47; see also 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 574-79 (1792). The dispersal proclamation
requirement was included in section 3 of the Act, and was ultimately required whenever the
President invoked his authority under any provision of the Act. § 3, 1 Stat. at 264.
40. § 2, 1 Stat. at 264.
41. Id. § 10, 1 Stat. at 265.
42. See CURRIE, supra note 34, at 162; see also Jay S. Bybee, Insuring Domestic Tranquility:
Lopez, Federalization of Crime, and the Forgotten Role of the Domestic Violence Clause, 66
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1,41-43 (1997).
43. COAKLEY, supra note 20, at 24-28 (describing the use of the Act during the Genet affair).
44. Id. at 24.
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to which early practice assumed that the Act governed the President's
authority to respond to an internal crisis. In response to the uprising on
Pennsylvania's frontier,45 Washington sought and received certification
from Supreme Court Justice James Wilson that circumstances necessitated
calling forth the militia.46 He then issued a proclamation commanding the
insurgents to disperse, and when his call went unheeded, he assembled
militiamen from four states-Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Virginia, and
Maryland-who eventually quelled the threat.4 7
Toward the end of the uprising, the Third Congress, in the first
legislative action of its second session, passed a statute specifically
reauthorizing the calling forth of the militia to keep the peace for an
additional three months and, if necessary, until thirty days after the
beginning of the next session of Congress. 48 The reauthorization statute was
necessary because section 2 of the 1792 Act explicitly barred the President
from using the militias of other states for more than thirty days once
Congress was back in session, which it had not been since the beginning of
the insurgency. But the specific details are largely insignificant; what
matters here is the extent to which everyone-the President, the Supreme
Court (through Justice Wilson), and Congress-closely adhered to the
explicit dictates of the 1792 Calling Forth Act. At no point did anyone
suggest that the Executive possessed any separate authority to deal with
the rebels. That Washington and his contemporaries used the Calling Forth
Act, and not any other source of power, as the authority for suppressing
the Whiskey Rebellion is as significant a statement of early understanding
as exists.
Yet, as much as the Calling Forth Act worked as intended during the
Whiskey Rebellion, Washington's experience dealing with the rebellion
also highlighted the flaws that the case-by-case regime necessarily created,
flaws that he implored the Third Congress to rectify. 49 Despite
Washington's suggestions, Congress did not seriously consider his
suggested reforms to the militia system, though it gave its imprimatur to
45. For what remains today the authoritative history of the Whiskey Rebellion, see LELAND
D. BALDWIN, WHISKEY REBELS: THE STORY OF A FRONTIER UPRISING (1939).
46. Why Washington used section 2 instead of section 1-i.e., why he did not treat the
uprising as an "insurrection," but rather as "combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the
ordinary course of judicial proceedings"-is unclear. It may have been dubious whether the
actions of the Whiskey Rebellion farmers truly rose to the level of insurrection.
47. See FREDERICK T. WILSON, FEDERAL AID IN DOMESTIC DISTURBANCES: 1787-1903, S.
DOc. No. 57-209, at 33-42 (2d Sess. 1903); COAKLEY, supra note 20, at 36-42. For details of the
military expedition itself, see id. at 43-68.
48. See Act of Nov. 29, 1794, ch. 1, 1 Stat. 403 (expired 1795).
49. George Washington, Sixth Annual Address to Congress (Nov. 19, 1794), in 34 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES, 1745-1799, at
28, 33-35 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940).
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his conduct by reenacting the Calling Forth Act on a permanent basis in
1795 with various revisions to enhance the President's powers under the
Act. Indeed,
[b]y his actions in the Whiskey Rebellion, Washington had
apparently dissipated the fears expressed in 1792 that these powers
"could not with safety be entrusted to the President of the United
States." The Whiskey Rebellion thus resulted in the establishment
of both a permanent law and a precedent for all future use of
federal military force in domestic disorders.5 °
In reenacting the Calling Forth Act, the Third Congress replaced the
original statute with the 1795 Militia Act, which removed-or heavily
diluted-several of the major checks on the President's authority under
section 2, though it left section 1 of the 1792 Act entirely intact. The 1795
Act changed the nature of the section 2 delegation in three critical ways.
First, the Act removed the requirement of an antecedent court order-which
had been added as a necessary amendment in 1792-leaving the President
as the sole arbiter of when circumstances necessitated the calling forth of
the militia.51 Second, the 1795 Act removed the 1792 Act's requirement
that militiamen from other states could be used only when Congress was
not in session,52 despite the fears at Philadelphia that militiamen from New
Hampshire might be sent to quell a disturbance in Georgia, and vice versa.
53
Third, the 1795 Act kept the dispersal proclamation requirement but
removed the requirement from the 1792 Act that such a proclamation be
issued "previous thereto," i.e., before calling out the militia.54 A fair reading
of the 1795 Act suggests that all Congress sought to require was a
contemporaneous proclamation-notice to the rebels that the troops were
on their way. Per the amended section 2,
[W]henever the laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the
execution thereof obstructed, in any state, by combinations too
powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial
proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by this act, it
50. COAKLEY, supra note 20, at 67-68 (footnote omitted).
51. To see this difference, compare the Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 424, 424
(repealed 1861), with the Calling Forth Act of 1792, ch. 28, § 2, 1 Stat. 264, 264 (repealed 1795).
See also CORWIN, supra note 16, at 161 (summarizing the differences between the 1792 and 1795
statutes); Cf CURRIE, supra note 34, at 161-62 & n.228 (noting that the 1795 statute omitted two
requirements in the 1792 statute and watered down a third).
52. Compare Militia Act of 1795 § 2, 1 Stat. at 424, with Calling Forth Act of 1792 § 2, 1
Stat. at 264.
53. See THE FEDERALIST No. 29, supra note 28, at 186-87 (Alexander Hamilton).
54. Compare Militia Act of 1795 § 3, 1 Stat. at 424, with Calling Forth Act of 1792 § 3, 1
Stat. at 264.
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shall be lawful for the President of the United States, to call forth
the militia of such state, or of any other state or states, as may be
necessary to suppress such combinations, and to cause the laws to
be duly executed; and the use of militia so to be called forth may be
continued, if necessary, until the expiration of thirty days after the
commencement of the then next session of Congress.
Thus, whereas section 2 of the 1792 Act envisioned a multistage
process (as during the Whiskey Rebellion) in which the President first had
to receive judicial acknowledgment of a crisis requiring the militia, then
could issue a proclamation ordering the insurgents to disperse, and then
could call out the militia only after such a proclamation had gone unheeded,
section 2 of the 1795 Act authorized the President to act decisively,
expeditiously, and, of most significance, unilaterally.56 Whereas the Second
Congress had intended the delegation of such broad authority to sunset after
three years and had required the intervention of a federal judge, the Third
Congress made the delegation permanent and expanded the President's
authority in the three critical areas discussed above-removing the
requirement of an antecedent court order and the bar on the use of out-of-
state militiamen and changing the timing of the dispersal proclamation
requirement.57 The 1792 and 1795 Acts thus clearly indicate the early
thinking behind presidential power in military emergencies-the power was
unquestionably Congress's to delegate.
C. "Calling Forth" the Federal Army: The 1807 and 1861 Acts
At first, the 1792 and 1795 Militia Acts were broad delegations of
authority with a narrow application-the Acts authorized the President to
call forth only the state militias, many, if not most, of which were in
55. Militia Act of 1795 § 2, 1 Stat. at 424. The time limit-capping the power "thirty days
after the commencement of the then next session of Congress"--suggests that Congress very
much had in mind the President's authority to act when Congress was not in session, both in 1792
and 1795. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 48 (describing Congress's necessary
reauthorization of the use of the militia to put down the Whiskey Rebellion). The thirty-day limit,
extended to sixty days in 1861, see infra text accompanying notes 69-73, required Congress to
weigh in when it was in session, at least when the militia was called forth other than to suppress
insurrections or repel invasions.
56. See CORWIN, supra note 16, at 161.
57. Perhaps by accident, the 1795 Act actually reined in presidential authority in one area,
however. Under the 1792 Act, only orders requiring militiamen to serve in other states expired
after thirty days absent congressional reauthorization. See Calling Forth Act of 1792 § 2, 1 Stat, at
264. In removing the distinction between the use of the home-state militia and that of other states,
the 1795 Act thus expanded the time limit to also include orders calling forth the militia of the
state in which the obstructions had taken place. See Militia Act of 1795 § 2, 1 Stat. at 424. 1 thank
Sydney Foster for raising this important point (and countless others).
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significant disarray at the Founding.58 President Adams used the 1795 Act
to threaten use of the militia in response to Fries's Rebellion in early
1799.59 On March 2 of that same year, Congress temporarily authorized the
President to use the federal army whenever the 1795 Act allowed him to
call out the state militias.60 Eight years later, prompted somewhat by
discrete events in 1806 and 1807-border incursions in the Southwest by
Spanish troops6 1 and the infamous Burr conspiracy 62-the Ninth Congress
permanently supplemented the 1795 Act with a statute comprising a single
sentence:
[I]n all cases of insurrection, or obstruction to the laws, either of the
United States, or of any individual state or territory, where it is
lawful for the President of the United States to call forth the militia
for the purpose of suppressing such insurrection, or of causing the
laws to be duly executed, it shall be lawful for him to employ, for
the same purposes, such part of the land or naval force of the
United States, as shall be judged necessary, having first observed
all the pre-requisites of the law in that respect.63
The legislative history behind the Insurrection Act is nonexistent,64
which is troubling because the Act clearly omitted invasion from those
circumstances where the federal regulars could be used. But for the open
58. See generally KOHN, supra note 19 (providing an overview of the decline of the state
militia systems in the early Republic-and the role of the Militia Acts in hastening this decline).
59. See FREDERICK T. WILSON, FEDERAL AID IN DOMESTIC DISTURBANCES: 1787-1903, S.
DOC. No. 57-209, at 42-45 (2d Sess. 1903); see also COAKLEY, supra note 20, at 69-77. There is
not room within these pages to fully document every instance in which the Militia Acts were
invoked in the early Republic, but as Wilson and Coakley demonstrate, it was commonplace to
rely on this statutory framework whenever resort to domestic military authority was necessary.
60. See Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 31, § 7, 1 Stat. 725, 726 (repealed 1802). The first statute
allowing the President to call forth a joint contingent of the militia and the "land or naval forces of
the United States" was the Neutrality Act of 1794, ch. 50, §§ 7-8, 1 Stat. 381, 384 (current version
at 18 U.S.C. § 960 (2000)). See COAKLEY, supra note 20, at 346-47 ("It was really this law that
led directly to another law passed in 1807 permitting the president to use the regular military
forces for the same purposes that the law of 1795 permitted him to use the militia.").
61. See S. DOC. No. 57-209, at 45-46; DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS:
THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801-1829, at 8 n.29 (2001).
62. For the extent to which the 1807 Act was motivated by the actions of Burr and his
cohorts, see George M. Dennison, Martial Law: The Development of a Theory of Emergency
Powers, 1776-1861, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 52, 56-58 (1974). See also COAKLEY, supra note 20,
at 83 ("In terms of the history of the use of federal military force in domestic disorders, the most
important result of the Burr conspiracy was the passage of a law, signed by Jefferson on 8 March
1807, authorizing the use of regulars as well as militia in these affairs.").
63. Insurrection Act of 1807, ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443, 443 (current version at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-
335 (2000)); see also Dennison, supra note 62, at 58 ("This legislation confirmed the President's
unilateral action during the Burr scare, but left intact the presumptions concerning the
subordination of military to civilian authority.").
64. See COAKLEY, supra note 20, at 83 n.46 ("There is no record of any debate in
Congress."). The Act was one of many passed on the last day of the Ninth Congress.
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hostility on the part of the Framers toward the use of a standing army in any
circumstance, one might easily infer that Congress omitted invasions from
the 1807 Act because it believed that the President inherently possessed the
power to use federal troops to repel invaders. Yet this understanding raises
the difficult question of why Congress would differentiate between
repelling invaders and suppressing insurrections in 1807, especially since it
did not so differentiate in 1799.65
An alternate supposition might be that concerns over the standing army
led Congress in 1807 to extend the calling-forth power only to those cases
in which the state militias might be compromised-to insurrections within a
state or obstruction of the laws therein-and to leave to the state militias the
initial responsibility of dealing with invaders, with other state militias
available to help should they be so summoned by the President under the
auspices of section 1 of the 1795 Act. The critical distinction between the
various cases was that invasions were the only instance in which the state
militia itself might not be one of the actors against which force was needed.
But in addition to the lack of legislative history, there is also no
academic discussion of this subtle change in wording between the 1795 and
1807 Acts. In the absence of additional discourse, neither of these
arguments can carry their own weight. This leaves the omission of invasion
from the 1807 Act a rather uncomfortable mystery. It certainly is not
obvious that Congress omitted invasion out of respect for the President's
inherent constitutional authority, in part because Congress did not make a
similar omission in the 1799 Act. Regardless, there can be little doubt that
Congress clearly meant to expand the calling-forth power to the regular
army in the other two contexts, including on those occasions governed by
section 2 of the 1795 Act.
One other important result of the 1807 Act was Congress's departure
from the First Militia Clause as the exclusive source of its authority to
regulate the President's emergency military power, because the Clause said
nothing about the use of federal troops.66 Instead, the 1807 Act is better
viewed as an amalgamation of Congress's calling-forth power with its other
Article I, Section 8 war powers. As Coakley concludes, "The development
of law on the two types of action [by the militia or by federal regulars]
followed a roughly similar course, although the laws were based upon
different constitutional clauses. 67 In this fashion, the Insurrection Act
started a trend that has continued to today-a trend in which Congress drew
65. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
66. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, c1. 15.
67. COAKLEY, supra note 20, at 347.
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on all of its constitutional authority, and not just the First Militia Clause, to
legislate presidential emergency power.68
The Militia Acts regime remained entirely untouched for the next half-
century until, on the eve of the Civil War, Congress once again tinkered
with the langgage of the 1795 Act, scrapping section 2 in favor of a
provision more amenable to the federalization of the militia in the looming
war against the Confederacy. Most importantly, section 1 of the 1861 Act,
which replaced section 2 of the 1795 Act (the provision that had dealt with
calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union), authorized the
President to call forth the militia or the federal armed forces
whenever, by reason of unlawful obstructions, combinations, or
assemblages of persons, or rebellion against the authority of the
Government of the United States, it shall become impracticable, in
the judgment of the President of the United States, to enforce, by
the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the laws of the United
States within any State or Territory [thereof] ....
The shift from the authority delegated by the 1795 Act to that provided
by the 1861 Act was subtle but crucial. The 1861 Act expanded the
President's power to use the militia to "execute the laws" to allow him to
call out the militia (and the federal armed forces) until sixty days after the
beginning of the then-next legislative session, unless Congress were to
intervene with a veto-proof resolution,70 whenever, in his judgment, it
became "impracticable ... to enforce. .. the laws of the United States
within any State or Territory." 7
Though cases before the Civil War had already endorsed widespread
presidential discretion under the Militia Acts, as discussed in more detail in
Part II, the 1861 Act crystallized and codified the general principles behind
those decisions, particularly Luther v. Borden.72 Specifically, the 1861 Act
68. Here, it is impossible to overstate the signal importance of the Insurrection Act to this
Note's.thesis. By extending the President's calling-forth power to the federal armed forces, the
Ninth Congress vitiated any arguments that the Constitution, through the First Militia Clause and
other provisions, granted Congress limited authority over only state militias, to be invoked in
highly specific situations. When the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutional structure as
implemented by the 1795 and 1807 Acts in the cases discussed in Part II, it was thus far more
significant that it was affirming the Insurrection Act, for the later statute was the less obviously
constitutional of the crucial pair.
69. Suppression of the Rebellion Act of 1861, ch. 25, § 1, 12 Stat. 281, 281 (current version
at 10 U.S.C. § 332 (2000)). The 1861 Act also replaced sections 3 and 4 of the 1795 Act-the
proclamation requirement and a provision subjecting the militias, once called forth, to the same
rules governing the conduct of the regulars. Section 1 of the 1795 Act, which governed the calling
forth of the militia to repel invaders or suppress insurrections, was left wholly intact.
70. Id. § 3, 12 Stat. at 282.
71. Id. § 1, 12 Stat. at 281.
72. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
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included three critical shifts from the existing regime. First, the 1861 Act
doubled the time period during which the President was authorized to call
forth the militia. Second, the Act expressly committed to the President's
sole discretion the determination that it was "impracticable" to execute the
laws. Last, the Act also added "rebellion against the authority of the
Government of the United States" to the list of instances under which the
power to use the militia to "execute the laws" could be invoked.73 Though
this provision was clearly intended to apply to the Confederacy, it would
also be relied upon ten years later for the authority to use military force to
respond to the Ku Klux Klan. In all, to whatever extent the 1795 Act had
removed or changed three important checks on the President's emergency
authority under the 1792 Act,74 the 1861 Act heavily diluted the major
checks that remained. 5
D. Martial Law, Habeas Corpus, and the Ku Klux Klan
The 1861 Act represented the third major revision to the Militia Act
regime, but the statutes have remained almost entirely unchanged in the 143
years since.76 The one exception, the Ku Klux Klan (Civil Rights) Act of
1871, helps underscore the importance of this Part's analysis of the specific
statutes to the Note's underlying thesis. Though the 1871 Act was
specifically targeted at the Klan, its delegation of emergency powers to the
President was broader, for it allowed the calling forth of the militia or the
regular army, or the resort to "other means," to enforce the civil rights
conferred by the Act, the earlier enforcement acts, and the Constitution
more generally-specifically, the Fourteenth Amendment.77
73. § 1, 12 Stat. at 281. The "rebellion" language ensured, whether deliberately or not, that
there would be no constitutional questions as to the propriety of suspending habeas corpus if the
President were to impose martial law under section 1 of the 1861 Act, since the Suspension
Clause allows suspensions of the writ only "when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. No such language was required for section 1
of the 1795 Act, which remained intact, given that it applied, on its terms, only to suppressing
insurrections and repelling invaders.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 51-54.
75. See COAKLEY, supra note 20, at 228 (noting that the 1861 Act "vastly strengthened the
president's authority to use both militia and regulars to suppress insurrections and execute the
laws of the Union").
76. The regime underwent some revision when Congress passed the Dick Act in 1903, which
replaced the Uniform Militia Act of 1792 as the federal regulatory statute for the militias. See
Dick Act, ch. 196, § 25, 32 Stat. 775, 780 (1903); see also Militia Reform Act of 1908, ch. 204,
35 Stat. 399 (formerly codified at 32 U.S.C. § 81a (1952)). Otherwise, nearly all of the language
of the Suppression of the Rebellion Act can be found in the U.S. Code today. Compare
Suppression of the Rebellion Act of 1861 §§ 1-3, 12 Stat. at 281-82, with 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-335
(2000).
77. Ku Klux Klan (Civil Rights) Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 3, 17 Stat. 13, 14 (current version at
10 U.S.C. § 333 (2000)); see also Force Act, ch. 114, § 13, 16 Stat. 140, 143 (1870) (formerly
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Section 4, by far the most powerful provision of the Act, even
authorized the suspension of habeas corpus to put down any rebellious
activity that threatened the enforcement provisions of the statute, though it
made such actions contingent upon the dispersal proclamation still required
by the Militia Acts.78 That provision, though it would expire at the end of
the next congressional session, underscores the extent to which martial law
was understood to come from the 1795 and 1807 Acts. This proposition
follows from the language of section 4, which specifically referred to the
Militia Acts as part of the process the President must follow in order to
suspend the writ, 79 even though there was no relationship between habeas
and the Militia Acts-except under the theory that suspension was
coincident to the imposition of martial law.
80
The 1871 Act highlights the evolution and drift of this broad area of
emergency power during the first hundred years of the Republic away from
the original understanding that the use of the military would be limited to
state militias-and then only in cases where troops were necessary to
suppress insurrections, to repel invasions, or to overcome "combinations
too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial
proceedings.'
By 1871, the President had unfettered statutory discretion to employ the
militias or the (now-powerful) federal army when certain conditions were
met. To that end, the 1871 Act textually committed to a conclusion the
courts had long since reached-that the imposition of martial law and the
suspension of habeas corpus were necessarily concomitant to this power
under certain statutorily prescribed circumstances. Although the Posse
Comitatus Act, enacted in 1878, created clear limits on the domestic use of
the federal military for crisis management (largely to respond to
Reconstruction-era excesses),8 2 the Militia Acts were among the few
statutory and constitutional provisions exempted from its coverage. 3
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1993 (1952) and repealed 1957) (authorizing the use of the militia or the
regulars to enforce aspects of the Act). For an excellent contemporary overview of the Ku Klux
Klan Act's background and impact, see James Forman, Jr., Juries and Race in the Nineteenth
Century, 113 YALE L.J. 895, 920-26 (2004). Though many of the provisions of the various
enforcement and force acts were struck down by the Supreme Court in United States v. Harris,
106 U.S. 629 (1883), the Court left section 3 of the Ku Klux Klan Act intact (section 4 had long
since expired).
78. Ku Klux Klan (Civil Rights) Act of 1871 § 4, 17 Stat. at 14-15 (expired 1873).
79. See id.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 116-120.
81. Calling Forth Act of 1792, ch. 28, § 2, 1 Stat. 264, 264 (repealed 1795).
82. Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 145, 152 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1385 (2000)).
83. See COAKLEY, supra note 20, at 345.
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But what is at least as telling about the evolution of the Militia Acts is
the consistent movement away from specific checks on presidential
authority under the regime, whether that movement was accomplished by
Congress or, as Part II will demonstrate in more detail, by the courts. By the
end of the nineteenth century, the Militia Acts had become an untethered
broadsword-a body of executive emergency power that probably included,
under certain circumstances, the authority to impose martial law and, the
necessary byproduct, to suspend habeas corpus. Absent from the framework
were any clear triggers creating distinctions between different degrees of
authority under the Acts, even though common sense (and, as Part II
suggests, case law) might otherwise demand that circumstances
necessitating the calling forth of the militia do not always merit such
extraordinary measures as martial law and the suspension of habeas.
Indeed, the gaps were left to be filled by presidential discretion that, as
the courts would hold, was largely unreviewable. Though the history of the
Militia Acts underscores the extent to which this structural relationship was
what both the Framers and early Congresses intended, courts interpreting
the Militia Acts regime only broadened executive authority under the Acts
and seldom suggested limits. Part I demonstrates that one important actor-
Congress-viewed itself, and not the President, as the key source of
emergency power. Over time, however, Congress gave away so much of its
power that, except for the language of the decisions discussed in Part 1I, it
might have been easy for commentators to overlook the source of such
authority.
II. THE MILITIA ACTS, THE COURTS, AND EMERGENCIES
This Part turns to the evolution of emergency power in nineteenth-
century U.S. courts. Before moving into the relationship between the
Militia Acts and the courts, however, it bears emphasizing that the Supreme
Court has mentioned the First Militia Clause itself on only a handful of
occasions, 84 and has interpreted it just twice-in 1918 in the Selective Draft
Law Cases85 and in 1990 in Perpich v. Department of Defense.86 With one
84. Clinton Rossiter, in his classic 1951 study of the relationship between the Supreme Court
and the Commander in Chief, highlights only a handful of cases as containing useful discussions
of the Clause, see CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
14-15 & n.4 (Richard Longaker ed., expanded ed. 1976), and only one significant interpretive
decision-Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334 (1990)-has been rendered since.
85. 245 U.S. 366 (1918). The Selective Draft Law Cases Court was faced with the question of
whether the First Militia Clause, by limiting the circumstances in which Congress could provide
for calling forth the state militias, served as a limit on Congress's incorporation of state militias
into the federal military as part of its more general power to raise armies. Chief Justice White,
writing for a unanimous Court, held that the Clause was not such a restriction, but was instead an
additional grant of power to the legislature. See id. at 384.
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exception, 87 none of the readings of the Clause in either case bears on this
Note in any significant fashion. Thus, our contemporary understanding
must be guided instead by courts' interpretations of the statutes most
directly implementing the Clause, to which this Note now turns. Section A
of this Part discusses the importance of two early landmark cases, Martin v.
Mott88 and Luther v. Borden,89 both of which read the Militia Acts as broad
constitutional delegations of emergency power from Congress to the
President-and as the source of the President's authority to impose martial
law. Luther, still today one of the Court's most significant emergency-
power decisions, squarely holds that the President's authority to impose
martial law, such as it is, comes from the Militia Acts, though the Court
struggled with defining the boundaries of such power.
Section B moves on to a broader discussion of emergency power during
the Civil War, highlighted by the Supreme Court's decision in the Prize
Cases, in which the Court sustained President Lincoln's imposition of a
blockade by reference to the Militia Acts. 90 Faced with the gravest national
security crisis in the nation's history, the Court deferred to Congress.
Finally, Section C concludes with a discussion of the two cases argued to
espouse the so-called "inherent presidential power" theory and explains
why at least one of them belongs more properly within the Militia Acts
regime. In all, the evolution of emergency power in the courts closely
tracked the evolution of the Militia Acts. Though courts finally began
placing limits on executive power under the Militia Acts regime by the mid-
twentieth century, they continually upheld the statutes as a broad source of
executive authority during internal emergencies.
A. Martial Law in the Early Republic: Mott and Luther
The President's discretion and the full scope of his authority under the
Militia Acts regime had already been before the Supreme Court three times
86. 496 U.S. 334. Perpich sustained the President's authority to send National Guard
members abroad for training without satisfying the preconditions of the First Militia Clause. As
Justice Stevens wrote for a unanimous Court, the American dual-enlistment system presupposes
that, once ordered to active federal duty, militia members become federal troops, and the
provisions of the Militia Clauses no longer apply. See id. at 350 ("The congressional power to call
forth the militia may in appropriate cases supplement its broader power to raise armies and
provide for the common defense and general welfare, but it does not limit those powers.").
87. The exception is Perpich's reading of the power to call forth the militia in tandem with
the power to raise armies and provide for the common defense, through which the Court implicitly
suggested that authority under the Militia Acts regime was not necessarily limited to the First
Militia Clause itself. This argument, however, necessarily followed from the text and history of
the 1807 Insurrection Act. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
88. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
89. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
90. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
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by 1861. Though the first instance saw little in the way of serious
discussion,91 the latter two cases-Mott and Luther-each embraced broad
readings of Congress's authority under the First Militia Clause, the
constitutionality of the 1795 Militia Act, and, as such, the President's
authority and discretion to impose martial law (and, by implication, his
power more generally during emergencies). The importance of Mott and
Luther as the fountainhead precedents of American emergency power law is
92 terrbeyond question, so their reliance on the Militia Acts cannot be
underscored enough.
At issue in Mott was whether a citizen could be court-martialed for his
failure to join the New York militia when the President called it out during
the War of 1812. Justice Story, writing for the Court, emphatically rejected
the argument that the President lacked the authority to so mandate the
service of citizens in their state militias, holding that such authority came
from the 1795 Militia Act. 93
Justice Story next turned to the issue of who was best suited to
determine whether circumstances justified calling forth the military. A
number of states had expressed serious skepticism (some bordering on
outright nullification)94 toward President Madison's authority to call out
state troops, but the Mott Court decisively sided with the Executive. 95
According to the Mott Court, the President's authority to determine whether
a crisis had arisen necessitating the calling forth of the troops was
unequivocally broad in its scope and unreviewable in its application:
If we look at the language of the act of 1795, every conclusion
drawn from the nature of the power itself, is strongly fortified....
91. See Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
92. See, e.g., Dennison, supra note 62, at 76.
93. In Justice Story's words, "It has not been denied here, that the act of 1795 is within the
constitutional authority of Congress, or that Congress may not lawfully provide for cases of
imminent danger of invasion, as well as for cases where an invasion has actually taken place."
Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 29. Story also suggested, in an important endorsement of preemptive
authority, that "[o]ne of the best means to repel invasion is to provide the requisite force for action
before the invader himself has reached the soil." Id.
94. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected the proposition that the President,
and not the Governor of Massachusetts, was empowered to determine whether an exigency had
arisen sufficient to require the calling forth of the militia. See Opinion of the Justices, 8 Mass. (7
Tyng) 548 (1812). For a discussion of the controversy and of the extent to which Mott may or may
not have settled the issue, see Hirsch, supra note 21, at 950-56 & n. 166.
95. As Justice Story concluded,
We are all of opinion, that the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen,
belongs exclusively to the President, and that his decision is conclusive upon all other
persons. We think that this construction necessarily results from the nature of the power
itself, and from the manifest object contemplated by the [1795 Militia Act]. The power
itself is to be exercised upon sudden emergencies, upon great occasions of state, and
under circumstances which may be vital to the existence of the Union.
Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 30.
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[The President] is necessarily constituted the judge of the existence
of the exigency in the first instance, and is bound to act according
to his belief of the facts.... The law does not provide for any
appeal from the judgment of the President, or for any right in
subordinate officers to review his decision, and in effect defeat
it.... [W]e are all of opinion that such is the true construction of
the act of 1795.96
Per the Mott Court, then, the 1795 Militia Act granted broad power to
the Executive to determine, for himself, when circumstances necessitated
the calling forth of the militia, and such a determination was not subject to
judicial review. Though Mott spoke more to the authority conferred by the
Militia Act with regard to invasions (since the War of 1812 was, after all, a
war in which America repelled British invaders), the broader source of
authority under the Act-the power to ensure proper execution of the
laws-necessarily followed by implication, and it would explicitly come
before the Court twenty-two years later in Luther v. Borden.
Luther v. Borden, which arose out of Dorr's Rebellion in Rhode Island,
raised the question of whether the Supreme Court could have any role in
determining which of the two competing state governments in Rhode Island
was legitimate and to what extent the "rebels" could sue under the
Guarantee Clause, alleging that the federal government owed them a
"republican" state government.97 The critical question before the Luther
Court, at least to the argument herein, was the former-whether the Court
could review President Tyler's determination that there was sufficient
turmoil in Rhode Island to invoke the Guarantee Clause's promise of
federal protection against "domestic violence. 98
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Taney found that it was the
province of the legislature to oversee the President's determination.
Congress could have made claims under the "domestic violence" subclause
justiciable, "[b]ut Congress thought otherwise, and no doubt wisely," and
passed the 1795 Militia Act to delegate its authority in that arena. 99 As
Taney concluded, "By this act, the power of deciding whether the exigency
had arisen upon which the government of the United States is bound to
interfere, is given to the President."100 The power to impose martial law, the
Luther Court held, was necessarily part of this authority, and came directly
96. Id. at 31-32.
97. For the facts, see Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 34-38, 42 (1849).
98. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
99. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 43.
100. Id. (emphasis added). Taney also provided an eloquent defense of why it was
appropriate for Congress to have vested such broad and unchecked power in the Executive. See id.
at 44; see also Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 32 (responding with similar eloquence to concerns
that power under the Militia Act was unduly broad).
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from the Militia Acts. This point bears emphasizing, for no court before or
since has so directly traced "martial law" to any part of the Constitution or
to an act of Congress.
Such power, the Court concluded, could not be subjected to review by
the courts, following (and largely adopting) Justice Story's logic from
Mott.0 1 Interestingly, however, the Luther Court did not suggest that such
power was without a check. Instead, "if the President in exercising this
power shall fall into error, or invade the rights of the people of the State, it
would be in the power of Congress to apply the proper remedy., 10 2 But
what legislative remedy could there be if such power wasn't fully within the
purview of Congress to begin with?
In dissent, Justice Woodbury adverted to an important distinction that
he claimed the majority overlooked-the differences between various
degrees of martial law. In responding to arguments that the Rhode Island
legislature had not actually meant to impose "martial law," Woodbury
suggested that the Court must be clear to distinguish between the martial
law governing the military and "martial law," which "is made .. to apply
to all."' 0 3 Per Justice Woodbury, the first type of "martial law" is the most
common-the Executive's authority over his own troops, which is
unquestionably wide ranging once the troops are in service. Second is what
has elsewhere been called "qualified" martial law-the government's
authority to use its troops as a defensive force for the public, maintaining
public order and keeping the peace. 1 04 This type of martial law, according to
Justice Woodbury, would include the power, if circumstances necessitated,
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, but is "far short" of what Rhode
Island had both said and done in the Luther case. 10 5 Third, and most severe,
is what has elsewhere been described as "punitive" martial law-the
authority to use troops domestically to punish, whether through military
trials of civilians or unusually harsh penalties for minor infractions.1
0 6
According to Justice Woodbury, it was the last category that transpired
in Rhode Island. 10 7 What most offended Woodbury was that he believed the
101. See Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 44-45.
102. Id. at 45.
103. Id. at 60 (Woodbury, J., dissenting).
104. See, e.g., Henry Winthrop Ballantine, Qualified Martial Law, A Legislative Proposal
(pts. 1 & 2), 14 MICH. L. REV. 102, 197 (1915-1916).
105. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 59-60 (Woodbury, J., dissenting). For the actions Justice
Woodbury believed the Rhode Island government had taken in error, see infra note 107.
106. See John P. Frank, Ex Parte Milligan v. The Five Companies: Martial Law in Hawaii, 44
COLUM. L. REV. 639, 650 (1944) (surveying the different types of martial law).
107. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 60 (Woodbury, J., dissenting) ("[T]hey not only said, eo
nomine, that they established 'martial law,' but they put in operation its principles; principles not
relating merely to imprisonment, like the suspension of the habeas corpus, but forms of arrest
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situation in Rhode Island was not severe enough to render resort to such
drastic measures appropriate or necessary:
It looks, certainly, like pretty bold doctrine in a constitutional
government, that, even in time of legitimate war, the legislature can
properly suspend or abolish all constitutional restrictions, as martial
law does, and lay all the personal and political rights of the people
at their feet. But bolder still is it to justify a claim to this
tremendous power in any State, or in any of its officers, on the
occurrence merely of some domestic violence. 
108
Given the vagaries of the statutory regime outlined in Part I, Justice
Woodbury's proposed trifurcation of martial law is significant. Here, for the
first time, were concrete suggestions for when the President could use
certain aspects of his delegated authority under the Militia Acts, and what
the limits were. His eloquence and foresight notwithstanding, however, the
more important aspect of Luther is the majority's holding that the power to
determine whether obstruction of the laws is sufficient to merit the calling
forth of the militia10 9 and to impose martial law is executive, but only by
virtue of the Militia Acts. Just as in Mott, the Court began and ended its
discussion of executive authority by invoking the 1795 statute. For both
Courts, it was the Militia Acts, and not any other authority, that had given
Presidents Madison and Tyler the authority to act as they did.10 The
President had unfettered discretion to invoke his authority, but only because
Congress had specifically intended and delegated such.
There can be little question that, as George Dennison wrote in 1974,
"[t]he Luther decision altered the American law of emergency powers,
although few seemed aware of the change."'"11 At its core, Luther stood for
the proposition that the power to impose martial law was a valid
constitutional grant, one that the President, by virtue of the Militia Acts,
was lawfully authorized to execute and carry out. The Taney Court, as
Dennison concluded, may have "intended to show that the Luther decision
without warrant, breaking into houses where no offenders were found, and acting exclusively
under military orders rather than civil precepts.").
108. Id. at 70.
109. The Luther Court found it insignificant that the militia had never actually been called
out. See id. at 44 (majority opinion). As Chief Justice Taney concluded, "The interference of the
President, therefore, by announcing his determination, was as effectual as if the militia had been
assembled under his orders. And it should be equally authoritative." Id.
110. It bears emphasizing here, as repeatedly highlighted by both Wilson and Coakley, that
compliance with the Militia Acts regime was generally the rule prior to the Civil War. Compare
Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827), with FREDERICK T. WILSON, FEDERAL AID IN
DOMESTIC DISTURBANCES: 1787-1903, S. Doc. No. 57-209, at 65-72 (2d Sess. 1903), and
COAKLEY, supra note 20, at 120-27.
111. Dennison, supra note 62, at 76.
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in 1849 applied only to the actions of states, and did not promulgate a
refined definition of martial law.... But Taney's attempted qualifications
of the broadly-worded [Luther] decision failed to impede the rising
acceptance of the new conception of emergency powers." ' 2 The validity of
this new conception included, at least tacitly because of Mott and Luther,
the centrality of the Militia Acts as a broad source of emergency power
beyond the power to suppress insurrections and repel invasions, 1 3 and it
would be a major issue before Northern courts during the Civil War.
B. Emergency Power During the Civil War
1. The Militia Acts and Martial Law: Field and the Trigger Problem
In his recent work on Abraham Lincoln and the legality of Lincoln's
actions during the Civil War, Daniel Farber seized on the Militia Acts as a
broad source of Lincoln's authority to impose martial law at the outset of
the war, 14 relying largely on Ex parte Field,1 5 an obscure decision of the
Circuit Court for the District of Vermont. Drawing on Mott and Luther, the
Field court argued that the Militia Acts delegated to the President the
authority to impose martial law at the outset of hostilities, and that the
imposition of martial law ipso facto included the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus. As the court concluded, because of the Acts, "the president
has the power, in the present military exigencies of the country, to proclaim
martial law, and, as a necessary consequence thereof, the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus in the case of military arrests."" 
6
112. Id. at 77.
113. The importance of the Luther Court's reading of the Militia Acts is best discerned from
the so-called Cushing Doctrine, derived from a series of opinions issued by Attorney General
Caleb Cushing in the mid-i 850s. The doctrine arose out of claims by President Fillmore, during
the disturbances in Boston after the passage of the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act, that the President
possessed inherent authority to use the regulars during domestic uprisings. In response, Cushing
articulated the position that, in enforcing the Act, a U.S. marshal could "call on federal military
forces in his district without any reference to the president whatsoever," but that this was by virtue
of the statutory regime created by Congress. COAKLEY, supra note 20, at 132; see also 8 Op.
Att'y Gen. 8, 11-15 (1856); 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 466 (1854). Though it makes no reference to Luther,
the Cushing Doctrine, the leading position on the subject until it was rejected by the Posse
Comitatus Act, suggests just how much Luther gave rise to broad claims of domestic military
authority under the Militia Acts.
114. FARBER, supra note 3, at 162-63.
115. 9 F. Cas. I (C.C.D. Vt. 1862) (No. 4761).
116. Id. at 8. Field thus distinguished itself from Exparte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (Taney,
Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487), in which Chief Justice Taney held Lincoln's
unilateral suspension of habeas unconstitutional, by arguing that, at the time of the Merryman
incident, the President had not yet imposed martial law. See Field, 9 F. Cas. at 8-9; see also
Vladeck, suora note 13, at 165 & nn.66-69 (discussing Field). Judge Smalley, author of Field,
was not the first American jurist to explicitly suggest the link between martial law and habeas;
Justice Woodbury had argued much the same position in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1,
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Field was something of an outlier in relying on congressional
authorization to uphold the legality of President Lincoln's actions,' 7 but it
certainly wasn't alone.1 8 Though lower courts split on the sources of
Lincoln's emergency powers during the war, the Field opinion was the only
one to address the nature of martial law in true detail, and its discussion of
the relationship between martial rule and habeas is as learned as it is
forceful. If the civil law is suspended via the imposition of military rule,
what court would be empowered to issue a writ of habeas corpus, even
assuming that one could apply for the writ? Especially after the Court's
discussion of martial law in Ex parte Milligan,19 the Field argument that
habeas must necessarily be suspended when martial law is in force
resonates quite loudly.
1 20
Equally loud, however, are arguments that the power to suspend habeas
is emphatically vested in Congress, per the Suspension Clause. 21 Field thus
suggests that the Militia Acts, which the Luther Court had clearly
established as the source of the power to impose martial law, necessarily
authorized the suspension of habeas under certain conditions. By
implication, then, it suggests that Lincoln's suspension of habeas at the
59-60 (1849) (Woodbury, J., dissenting). Cf Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2671 n.4
(2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing imposition of martial law as "a step even more drastic
than suspension of the writ").
117. A handful of lower court cases prior to the Prize Cases had suggested that most of
Lincoln's authority to act came from his executive power. See, e.g., United States v. The Tropic
Wind, 28 F. Cas. 218, 220-22 (C.C.D.D.C. 1861) (No. 16,541a); The Amy Warwick, 1 F. Cas.
799, 804 (D. Mass. 1862) (No. 341).
118. This is a significant point, for Judge Smalley, writing for the Field court, suggested that
it was. See Field, 9 F. Cas. at 8 ("I am aware that the conclusion at which I have arrived may seem
to conflict with some very high authorities, but it appears to me that they can be reconciled.").
Because the argument, at its core, is that Congress de facto authorized the suspension of habeas in
authorizing the imposition of martial law, all of the contraindicated authorities are satisfied-the
suspension was by Congress; it just wasn't explicit.
Further, the Field court was not the only Civil War-era lower court to focus on the Militia
Acts as a key source of Lincoln's emergency power. See, e.g., United States v. One Hundred and
Fifty-Six Packages of Tea, 27 F. Cas. 271, 272-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1865) (No. 15,933) (centering on the
1861 Act as providing broad authority to Lincoln to declare seceded states to be in insurrection,
and to seize goods from such states); McCall's Case, 15 F. Cas. 1225, 1226-30 (E.D. Pa. 1863)
(No. 8669) (summarizing Lincoln's broad authority over troops at the beginning of the war and
emphasizing the role of Congress); United States v. One Hundred and Twenty-Nine Packages, 27
F. Cas. 284, 288-90 (E.D. Mo. 1862) (No. 15,941) (holding that Lincoln's authority to determine
that-and when-Tennessee had entered into a state of insurrection derived from the Militia
Acts).
119. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). As discussed in more detail below, the Milligan Court
famously held that martial law can be appropriate away from the battlefield only when the courts
are not open or their process unobstructed.
120. For more detailed discussions of the relationship between martial law and habeas, see
John H. Hatcher, Martial Law and Habeas Corpus, 46 W. VA. L.Q. 187 (1940); and J.W. Brabner
Smith, Martial Law and the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 30 GEO. L.J. 697 (1942).
121. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038,
1264 (1970).
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outset of the Civil War was unilateral only to the extent to which it was not
coincident with the imposition of martial rule. Such was the case in Ex
parte Merryman'22 and Ex parte Benedict,123 where Lincoln's actions were
rejected, but not in Field.
More importantly, Field highlights the problem with the Militia Acts
regime that Justice Woodbury's dissent in Luther had first hinted at: What
are the different triggers authorizing varying degrees of presidential action?
Are the imposition of martial law and the resultant habeas suspension
automatically authorized as soon as the President can invoke the Acts?
Certainly, nothing in the Acts themselves suggests the contrary, but would
it not defy common sense for the broadest authority under the Acts to be
available any time the regime was invoked?
Leaving these questions aside for a moment, one thing is clear:
According to James Garfield Randall, author of what remains today the
most comprehensive legal analysis of Lincoln's actions, "[T]he emergency,
as interpreted by the Lincoln administration, was precisely that for which
the use of militia had been expressly authorized. To execute the laws, to
suppress an insurrection, to put down combinations too powerful for
judicial methods-these were the purposes for which the Government
needed troops."' 124 It would be up to the Supreme Court to police the
boundaries of President Lincoln's authority once invoked.
2. The Importance of the Prize Cases
Judge Smalley's discussion in Field notwithstanding, the most
significant of the Civil War-era cases, at least to the question of presidential
emergency power, was the Supreme Court's 1863 decision in the Prize
Cases, the consolidation of four admiralty suits filed shortly after the
beginning of the war.125 The core issues before the Prize Cases Court were
the constitutionality of President Lincoln's imposition of a naval blockade
122. 17 F. Cas. 144 (Taney, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
123. 3 F. Cas. 159 (N.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 1292).
124. J.G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 243 (Peter Smith ed.,
Univ. of 11. Press rev. ed. 1963) (1926); see also COAKLEY, supra note 20, at 227 ("In theory the
Lincoln administration did treat the secession of the Southern states as an insurrection to be
handled under the laws of 1795 and 1807 .... And it secured a permanent revision of those laws
vastly strengthening the executive's hand."). The reality, though, fit more into what Randall
described as the dual theory of the war-that, constitutionally, the war was an insurrection, but
from the perspective of the actual conduct of troops and the rights owed to enemy soldiers, the
traditional (and international) laws of war should and would apply. See RANDALL, supra, at 48-73.
125. For a thorough modem discussion of the cases' background and particulars, see ROBERT
BRUCE MURRAY, LEGAL CASES OF THE CIVIL WAR 1-18 (2003). See also William G. Young,
Amy Warwick Encounters the Quaker City: The District of Massachusetts and the President's
War Powers, 74 MASS. L. REV. 206 (1989) (surveying the facts and the proceedings below).
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at the outset of hostilities and the source of his authority to do so.
(Congress, at the time of the four captures before the Court in the Prize
Cases, had yet to specifically authorize the blockade, though it would do so
later as part of a broader ratification of Lincoln's actions.) 126 The critical
passage, at least on the authority point, came early in Justice Grier's
opinion for the Court, in what remains today the definitive statement of
defensive war power under the Constitution. As Justice Grier wrote,
The Constitution confers on the President the whole Executive
power.... He has no power to initiate or declare a war either
against a foreign nation or a domestic State. But by the Acts of
Congress of February 28th, 1795, and 3d of March, 1807, he is
authorized to call[] out the militia and use the military and naval
forces of the United States in case of invasion by foreign nations,
and to suppress insurrection against the government of a State or of
the United States.
127
Subsequent courts and commentators have routinely invoked the next
passage of Justice Grier's opinion as the decision's critical conclusion, for
the Court continued, "If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the
President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force. He does
not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for
any special legislative authority., 128 As the opinion concluded,
126. See Act of Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 63, § 3, 12 Stat. 326, 326.
127. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1863) (emphasis added). As highlighted
above, the 1807 Act quite clearly did not authorize use of the federal military and naval forces to
repel invaders. But this misstatement only further underscores the confusion surrounding the 1807
Act. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67.
128. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 668; see also FARBER, supra note 3, at 138-41
(discussing the Prize Cases and, in passing, the role of the Militia Acts). In Padilla, Judge Wesley
cited this passage for the proposition that
common sense and the Constitution allow the Commander in Chief to protect the nation
when met with belligerency and to determine what degree of responsive force is
necessary.... Regardless the title given the force, the President, in fulfilling his duties
as Commander in Chief to suppress insurrection and to deal with belligerents aligned
against the nation, is entitled to determine the appropriate response.
Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 727-28 (2d Cir. 2003) (Wesley, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), rev'd on other grounds, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004). But the Prize Cases Court
specifically found the President's authority "to suppress insurrection and to deal with belligerents"
in the Militia Acts and not in Article II of the Constitution.
Another contemporary example of this common and critical misunderstanding of the Prize
Cases is Judge Silberman's conclusion in Campbell v. Clinton that "the Prize Cases... stand for
the proposition that the President has independent authority to repel aggressive acts by third
parties even without specific congressional authorization, and courts may not review the level of
force selected." 203 F.3d 19, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman, J., concurring). The latter claim is
clearly correct, but the former claim simply isn't complete; it neglects the extent to which what
had made more specific authorization unnecessary were prior Acts of Congress-the 1795 and
1807 Acts.
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Whether the President in fulfilling his duties, as Commander-
in-chief, in suppressing an insurrection, has met with such armed
hostile resistance, and a civil war of such alarming proportions as
will compel him to accord to them the character of belligerents, is a
question to be decided by him, and this Court must be governed by
the decisions and acts of the political department of the
Government to which this power was entrusted.12
The distinction between "authorized" and "bound" is telling-the
authorization to act, according to the Court, came from the Militia Acts. But
it was the President's constitutional responsibility as Commander in Chief
that obligated him to act. In effect, Grier suggested, Congress made
presidential action appropriate, and, once it had, the Constitution rendered
such action both necessary and unreviewable. Critically, if the President's
authority to act stemmed solely from Article II, the existence of
congressional authorization would (and could) not have been a necessary
precondition-he would have been bound to act whether Congress
authorized the action or not. Read together, these passages endorse broad
executive war power but emphasize the reason why the President did not
need to wait for "special legislative authority." It was not because the
Constitution independently conferred such power upon him. Rather, earlier
acts of Congress had delegated such authority and did not require specific
reaffirmation at the outset of hostilities in 1861.130
Indeed, without question, the Prize Cases endorse a broad
understanding of the President's war powers with respect to his independent
authority to act during crises. But the underlying constitutional source of
these powers, per the Court itself, is not the President but Congress, which
delegated them to the President via the Militia Acts. The Prize Cases thus
129. Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 670. This particular passage, a favorite of Fairman's,
see FAIRMAN, supra note 16, § 3 1, at 119, was also relied on by William Rehnquist, shortly before
he was named to the Court, in a speech defending the Nixon Administration's position on the
constitutionality of the war in Cambodia, see William H. Rehnquist, The Constitutional Issues-
Administration Position, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 628, 631 (1970).
For a fascinating contemporary discussion of this passage and where it fits into the Court's
presidential authority jurisprudence, see El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. United States,
378 F.3d 1346, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In El-Shifa, the invocation of the Prize Cases came in the
context of the court's discussion of "the inherent power vel non of the President to designate as
enemy property the private property of an alien that is situated on foreign soil." Id. at 1362.
130. To be sure, politics may have required the Prize Cases Court to sustain the blockade
even without any underlying congressional authority, given the disastrous political ramifications
of a ruling formally according the Confederacy the status of belligerents. But the Militia Acts
provided the Court with a statutory means around the political mess, since it was a fair reading of
the statutes, especially in light of Luther and the Suppression of the Rebellion Act of 1861, that
they conferred upon President Lincoln the authority to impose the blockade-to use the military
to suppress an insurrection. The reliance on the Militia Acts was all the more telling given that the
courts below had upheld the blockade by reference to the President's constitutional authority. See,
e.g., The Amy Warwick, I F. Cas. 799, 804 (D. Mass. 1862) (No. 341).
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embrace the logic of Field-that President Lincoln had massive and nearly
unchecked authority to suppress an insurrection and that it was at least
largely under this aegis that he undertook most of his actions (and that his
actions should be sustained). But the reason why Lincoln had such power
was just as clear: Congress, not the Constitution, had given it to him. It
didn't matter that Congress hadn't given President Lincoln such power in
1861: the single most important point of the Prize Cases was that Congress
gave the President such authority in 1795 and 1807. The Prize Cases,
among the most significant war power precedents in the annals of the
Supreme Court, turned not on any provision of the Constitution, but on the
Militia Acts.
3. Milligan and a Suggested Trigger
The Prize Cases Court's broad reading of executive authority saw one
important clarification three years later in the context of the use of military
tribunals against civilians in the North. After the war, a very different
Court, in Ex parte Milligan, adopted a much more cynical tone in judging
the constitutionality of President Lincoln's unilateral creation and
implementation of such quasi-courts far from the battlefields. 31 The
Milligan Court, clarifying Luther, famously concluded that "[m]artial rule
can never exist where the courts are open, and in the proper and
unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction. It is also confined to the locality
of actual war." 
132
Because the civil courts were functioning properly in Indiana at the
time of the trial of Lamdin P. Milligan, all nine Justices concluded that his
trial by military commission could not stand. The flip side of Milligan,
though, was the conception that martial law should be available as a
constitutional power in times when these conditions were not met. As much
as the Milligan Court dramatically argued against the subversion of civil
law in the context of the Indianapolis military tribunals, it just as strongly
suggested that martial law itself, as a concept, was not completely foreign
to the Constitution-an important concession from an otherwise
unsympathetic Court.
But there was a second opinion in Milligan, written by Chief Justice
Chase on behalf of himself and Justices Wayne, Swayne, and Miller.
Together, the four Justices agreed with the rest of the Court that Milligan's
trial by military tribunal was unauthorized, but they disagreed that it could
never be constitutional. Instead, the concurring Justices emphasized the
131. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
132. Id. at 127.
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importance of the absence of congressional authorization-that a military
tribunal created unilaterally by President Lincoln could not try Milligan, but
perhaps such a tribunal authorized by Congress could have. 133 As part of
their discussion, the concurring Justices highlighted the wide-ranging war
and emergency powers granted to Congress, including those conferred via
the First Militia Clause,1 34 and concluded that such powers conceivably
could extend to the creation of military commissions. Because no act of
Congress existed that could fairly be read to authorize such tribunals,
however, the four concurring Justices agreed with their brethren that
Milligan's trial was unconstitutional.
135
Whereas all nine Justices agreed that President Lincoln could not
unilaterally create military commissions, only five also agreed that
Congress lacked such authority away from the battlefield. For this latter
proposition, commentators have scorned Milligan as an example of post
hoc overreaching,136 and a later Court has overruled-or at least heavily
distinguished-the decision on this point. 137 But in rejecting the unilateral
power of the President to create and administer military commissions, every
member of the Milligan Court only reinforced the conclusion at the core of
the Prize Cases. Together, the Prize Cases and Milligan compel a simple,
elegant framework for presidential power during the Civil War: When the
President acted alone, without anything in the way of congressional
authorization, the Court subjected his actions to rigorous constitutional
scrutiny, and his power was at its most reduced state. When the President
acted pursuant to some congressional authority, the Court subjected his
actions to almost no scrutiny, and his power was at its peak. This
conception of presidential emergency power should sound markedly
familiar. 138
133. As Chief Justice Chase wrote,
[T]he opinion which has just been read... asserts not only that the military
commission held in Indiana was not authorized by Congress, but that it was not in the
power of Congress to authorize it; from which it may be thought to follow, that
Congress has no power to indemnify the officers who composed the commission
against liability in civil courts for acting as members of it. We cannot agree to this.
Id. at 136 (opinion of Chase, C.J.).
134. See id. at 137-40.
135. See id. at 134-36.
136. For two stark examples, see ROSSITER, supra note 84, at 34-37; and MARTIN S.
SHEFFER, THE JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS 28-29 (1999).
137. See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (upholding the domestic use of military tribunals
during wartime to try eight Nazi saboteurs-including two U.S. citizens-captured within the
United States). In Quirin, as opposed to Milligan, there was congressional authorization.
138. This is precisely the outline Justice Jackson had in mind in Steel Seizure in delineating
the three categories of presidential authority. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel
Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurTing).
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What is less familiar is the importance of the Militia Acts. The Acts
were the crucial linchpin on which the Prize Cases Court relied, invoked as
the sole basis for the President's broad and unchecked power to suppress
insurrections. Without a similar statutory grant in Milligan, the Court
looked far more hesitantly on presidential power, especially the four
concurring Justices, who assumed that the Constitution could not bestow
upon the Executive powers granted to-and unexercised by-Congress.
What Milligan implicitly suggests, then, is a limitation on the
President's power under the Militia Acts' 39 -a judicial trigger among the
three categories of martial rule. 140 Whereas Lincoln had the power to
impose a blockade at the outset of hostilities by virtue of the 1795 and 1807
delegations, his authority could not extend to the creation and use of
military tribunals that Congress had not otherwise authorized when the
courts were open and their process unobstructed. The status of the civil
judicial system was the critical factor: When the courts were open, punitive
martial rule could not exist. Thus, the President was limited to only those
powers short of the imposition of punitive martial law. But when the courts
were closed, martial rule, whatever its limits, would obtain. 14 1 The Court
refused to read the power to create military tribunals off the battlefield into
the same broad grant of authority that authorized the imposition of a
blockade to suppress an insurrection, suggesting that there were no
circumstances under which such tribunals could be reconciled with the
Constitution.
At bottom, then, Milligan may properly be cast as the first of a
progressive series of cases in which the Court began to impose limits on the
President's power with respect to martial law and military emergencies.
Under Mott, Luther, and the Prize Cases, it had held the determination that
an emergency existed and the exercise of power during that emergency were
largely, if not entirely, beyond judicial review. In cases arising out of state
insurrections, 142 and later the imposition of martial law in Hawaii during
139. Indeed, David Dudley Field, Milligan's lawyer, invoked the calling-forth power several
times during his argument before the Court in support of his position against the executive power
at issue. See Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 32-33.
140. See supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text (discussing the distinctions between the
different types of martial law suggested by Justice Woodbury in his dissent in Luther).
141. Though the force of Milligan was called into some doubt by Quirin, this principle, one
of the Supreme Court's truly landmark statements, survived intact and was reaffirmed in Duncan
v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946). For a discussion of the relationship between Milligan,
Quirin, and Duncan, see Vladeck, supra note 13, at 172-73 & n. 113. See also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
124 S. Ct. 2633, 2669-70 & n.4 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the disputed relationship
between Milligan and Quirin).
142. The state cases are less relevant here because they dealt more directly with the power of
state executives and spoke of the Federal Constitution only when it came to the reviewability of
the state's actions, see, e.g., Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932), and the due process
rights--or lack thereof--of those detained, see, e.g., Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909).
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World War 11,143 the Court stepped back and explicitly suggested limits-
albeit soft ones-on the government's previously unreviewable power under
the Militia Acts. But neither Milligan nor these subsequent cases fully
resolved Justice Woodbury's concerns in Luther, for none suggested just
what the line was between the first and second degrees of martial law
(Milligan had clearly drawn the line for the third) or who should police it.
C. The Problem of "'Inherent" Presidential Power: Debs and Neagle
Finally, no discussion of the nineteenth-century evolution of American
emergency power in the courts could overlook the two cases most often
cited for the existence of "inherent" presidential power, Cunningham v.
Neagle144 and In re Debs.145 In Neagle, the Court was confronted with the
legality of an Executive Order (not based on any underlying statutory
authority) authorizing a U.S. marshal to protect Justice Stephen Field. The
marshal killed a would-be assassin and, after he was arrested by California
authorities, filed a habeas petition seeking his release, alleging that he was
being held for actions taken under the lawful authority of the United
States. 146 Justice Miller, writing for the Court, concluded that the marshal
was acting pursuant to lawful authority, for the President was entitled,
under the Take Care Clause, to authorize protection for a sitting Supreme
For a survey of the issues arising from the state insurrections, as well as discussions of the
relevant state court decisions, see Charles Fairman, Martial Rule and the Suppression of
Insurrection, 23 ILL. L. REV. 766 (1929); and Edward S. Corwin, Martial Law, Yesterday and
Today, 47 POL. SC. Q. 95 (1932). The state cases culminated in the Court's thorough denunciation
of extraconstitutional emergency powers in Home Building & Loan Ass 'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
398, 425 (1934). See also Michal R. Belknap, The New Deal and the Emergency Powers
Doctrine, 62 TEX. L. REv. 67, 92-98 (1983) (discussing Blaisdell).
143. In Duncan v. Kahanamoku, the Supreme Court rejected the Governor of Hawaii's use of
federal military courts to try civilians for civilian crimes during World War II, even though the
Hawaiian Organic Act explicitly vested in the Governor the authority to impose martial law, along
with the discretion to control its exercise. Act of Apr. 30, 1900, ch. 339, § 67, 31 Stat. 141, 153
(repealed 1959). Reaffirming Milligan, a necessary step in light of the Court's decision in Ex
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), the Duncan Court rejected the theory of"punitive" martial law:
The phrase "martial law" as employed in [the Organic] Act, therefore, while intended
to authorize the military to act vigorously for the maintenance of an orderly civil
government and for the defense of the Islands against actual or threatened rebellion or
invasion, was not intended to authorize the supplanting of courts by military tribunals.
Duncan, 327 U.S. at 324. Again, however, the Court took no issue with the notion that the
Constitution empowered Congress to provide for the imposition of martial law via legislation;
rather, the Court's concern, as in Milligan and Constantin, was with the limits on its exercise.
Even during wartime, the Court refused to accept the argument that the power to impose martial
law came from anywhere except an act of Congress.
144. Cunningham v. Neagle (In reNeagle), 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
145. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
146. For a concise, contemporary recitation of the facts leading to Neagle, see WILLIAM H.
REHNQUIST, CENTENNIAL CRISIS: THE DISPUTED ELECTION OF 1876, at 149-52 (2004). See also
CARL BRENT SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD: CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW 328-61 (1930).
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Court Justice even in the absence of a specific constitutional grant or an act
of Congress. As Miller concluded,
That there is a peace of the United States; that a man
assaulting a judge of the United States while in the discharge of
his duties violates that peace; that in such case the marshal of the
United States stands in the same relation to the peace of the
United States which the sheriff of the county does to the peace of
the State of California; are questions too clear to need argument
to prove them.
147
Neagle and Debs, as discussed below, are often cited as two key
precedents supporting the concept of "inherent" presidential emergency
power and the concept that the President, by virtue of the Take Care Clause,
has emergency powers nowhere explicit in the Constitution. But Neagle's
contribution to this theory is questioned even by the most ardent supporters
of broad presidential power,1 48 and Professor Henry Paul Monaghan's
arguments about Neagle endorsing only a narrower "protective" executive
power have been widely received. 49 This is not to reject the theory of
inherent presidential power outright; but at least in the area of domestic
emergency power, the Militia Acts appear to emerge from Neagle
unscathed. The Neagle Court suggested that there are some limited
presidential protective powers inherent in the authority under the Take Care
Clause, but given the scope and breadth of contraindicated precedents on
the question of emergency power, "inherent" presidential power seems a far
cry from "emergency" presidential power.
147. Neagle, 135 U.S. at 69. Building on Miller's opinion, Professor Monaghan dubbed this
the "protective power of the presidency" in his eloquent article of the same name. See Monaghan,
supra note 3, at 1.
148. See, e.g., SHEFFER, supra note 136, at 34.
149. For Monaghan's argument, see supra note 147. For examples of its reception, see
Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power To Execute the Laws, 104
YALE L.J. 541, 545 n.6 (1994); and H. Jefferson Powell, The President's Authority over Foreign
Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 527, 535 n.38 (1999).
Dozens of contemporary scholars, Prakash and John Yoo prominent among them, have
argued for far broader conceptions of executive power, especially in the foreign affairs field. See,
e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111
YALE L.J. 231 (2001); John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHi. L. REV. 1639
(2002). But at least with regard to domestic crisis authority during emergencies, they rely on little
in the way of legal precedent separate from Neagle and Debs, and Monaghan seems to have the
better of the argument with regard to Neagle-that it espouses only a limited theory of
presidential power. See Monaghan, supra note 3, at 65-66. Monaghan does argue that the
President's power under the Militia Acts "arguably ... exists absent statute," id. at 65, but this is a
nonstarter, for he himself implicitly acknowledges the centrality of the statutes, tracing the
relationship between Neagle and its predecessor case, Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879), to
the modem-day form of the Militia Acts, 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-335 (2000). See Monaghan, supra note
3, at 65 n.313.
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Five years later, in In re Debs, the Court was confronted with the
constitutionality of the use of federal troops by President Cleveland to help
restore order in Chicago during the Pullman strike of 1894.150 In broad
language, Justice Brewer sustained the action, largely by reference to
Neagle, on the grounds that "[tjhe entire strength of the nation may be used
to enforce in any part of the land the full and free exercise of all national
powers and the security of all rights entrusted by the Constitution to its
care."' 151 But there is an important historical footnote to Debs that neither
the Court nor most commentators on the case paid attention to: What was
truly at issue in Debs was President Cleveland's authority under the Militia
Acts to call out the federal army to ensure the "faithful execution of the
laws." The Court even intimated as much in one passage, 152 though it was
ultimately vague as to the actual source of the President's power.
Whereas the Court may have been unclear as to the source of
Cleveland's authority, the President himself wasn't, and he generally
followed the guidelines of the Militia Acts. 153 As David Gray Adler wrote,
"When President Cleveland deployed troops to break the Pullman Strike
over the protest of Governor Altgeld, on the altogether unpersuasive claim
that the enforcement of federal laws was being obstructed, he forgot to
issue the proclamation [required by the Militia Act].' 54 Debs was a
challenge to whether Cleveland's power under the Militia Acts regime
could lawfully extend to interference with the mails; it was not a challenge
to its source.
155
150. The justification for calling out the federal army was interference with the mails, a
dubious proposition at best on which to hang such bold imposition of federal authority, especially
given the vehement protests of Illinois Governor Altgeld to the contrary. See David Gray Adler,
The Steel Seizure Case and Inherent Presidential Power, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 155, 183-86
(2002).
151. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 582 (1895).
152. Id. ("The strong arm of the national government may be put forth to brush away all
obstructions to the freedom of interstate commerce or the transportation of the mails. If the
emergency arises, the army of the Nation, and all its militia, are at the service of the Nation, to
compel obedience to its laws.").
153. See Proclamation No. 11, 28 Stat. 1249 (1894) (commanding the "insurgents," such as
they were, to disperse, as required by the Militia Acts). As Clayton Laurie and Ronald Cole
explain, the leading proponent for using the Militia Acts was Cleveland's Attorney General,
Richard Olney, whose legal arguments ultimately carried the day. See LAURIE & COLE, supra
note 20, at 136-38.
154. Adler, supra note 150, at 184-85; see also ALMONT LINDSEY, THE PULLMAN STRIKE:
THE STORY OF A UNIQUE EXPERIMENT AND OF A GREAT LABOR UPHEAVAL 164-65 (1942)
(providing an overview of the Cleveland Administration's strategy for using military force to put
down the strike).
155. As Professor Adler concluded,
[E]ven if one embraces the concept of a "peace of the United States" that the president
has a duty to protect, it is a concept that must be viewed in the context of a Constitution
that assigns to Congress alone both the law-making power and the authority to govern
the use of military force, unless one invokes the vague notion of an extra-constitutional
emergency power, which the Debs Court avoided altogether.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2004]
The Yale Law Journal
III. THE MILITIA ACTS, EMERGENCY POWER, AND THE ACADEMY
Early scholars, particularly Charles Fairman and Edward Corwin, paid
plenty of attention to the Militia Acts in their analysis of emergency power,
particularly with respect to martial law and the defensive war power. As
Sections A and B suggest, Fairman and Corwin didn't fully understand the
significance of their analysis, and both misread the significance of the Prize
Cases, but at least they understood that the Acts had a role to play in their
analysis. By contrast, subsequent discussions of executive emergency
power, especially contemporary analysis, have wholly neglected the
centrality of the Militia Acts to our understanding of the constitutional
source of emergency power.156 This Part, by surveying the evolution of the
discussion of emergency power in the academy, attempts to explain both
how the Militia Acts disappeared from the academic discourse and why it is
so important that they return.
A. Corwin, Fairman, and the Misreading of the Prize Cases
Martial law and emergency power were popular topics in the years
leading up to and surrounding World War 11,157 and the two leading mid-
century commentators, without question, were Charles Fairman and Edward
Corwin. Of most importance is the work of Corwin, still recognized today
as one of the preeminent authorities on presidential power. Corwin's
earliest significant contribution to emergency scholarship came in a 1932
review of Fairman's The Law of Martial Rule entitled Martial Law,
Yesterday and Today.158 Noting that "[t]he judicial history of martial law
under the Constitution opens with... Luther v. Borden,"'1 59 Corwin invoked
Adler, supra note 150, at 185.
156. See, e.g., STEVENS, supra note 7; sources cited supra note 8.
157. Most prominent among the scholars besides Corwin and Fairman was Henry Ballantine,
who wrote a series of articles on martial law shortly before and after World War I. See, e.g.,
Henry Winthrop Ballantine, Martial Law, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 529 (1912); Ballantine, supra note
104; Henry Winthrop Ballantine, Unconstitutional Claims of Military Authority, 24 YALE L.J. 189
(1915).
The only early scholar to attempt to trace the constitutional source of the authority to impose
martial law, however, was Robert Rankin. See Robert Stanley Rankin, The Constitutional Basis of
Martial Law, 13 CONST. REV. 75 (1929). Rankin's short piece, ten years before his longer work
on the subject, see ROBERT S. RANKIN, WHEN CIVIL LAW FAILS: MARTIAL LAW AND ITS LEGAL
BASIS IN THE UNITED STATES (1939), concluded that Neagle identified Article II as the primary
constitutional source of the power to impose martial law. He argued that "[i]t is evident from the
above discussion of the constitutional provisions that relate to martial law, that the duty of
declaring martial law and of putting it into force is placed in the hands of the President." Rankin,
supra, at 80.
158. Corwin, supra note 142 (reviewing CHARLES FAIRMAN, THE LAW OF MARTIAL RULE
(1930)).
159. Id. at 97.
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the Prize Cases for the proposition, erroneous per the discussion above, that
"the President, by virtue of his power as Chief Executive and his power as
Commander-in-Chief, was entitled to treat a region which he found to be in
insurrection as enemy country and thereby strip all of its inhabitants of their
constitutional rights." 160 As early as 1932, Corwin understood the centrality
of the Prize Cases to the debate, even in light of Milligan. 61 What he didn't
understand was the centrality of the Militia Acts to the Prize Cases. This
interpretive error would become more significant in his later work.
Additionally, at the conclusion of his 1932 piece, Corwin first
suggested his argument with respect to the source of the power to impose
martial law, tying Neagle directly to "the President's power to employ
martial law, as well as his power to employ military force in execution of
the laws of the United States."' 162 Corwin, at least in this early discussion,
was convinced that Congress could act to place limits on presidential
declarations, but he was just as convinced that, absent such statutory action,
the President's authority was largely unfettered. As he concluded,
A statutory rule definitive of occasions requiring martial law would
have to be in such broad terms as to leave it at the mercy of
interpretation. On the other hand, for Congress to interfere with an
existing declaration would require, in the face of a certain veto, a
two-thirds vote in each house. 
63
Corwin's opinion changed somewhat between 1932, when he wrote
Martial Law, Yesterday and Today, and 1948, when he published the third,
revised edition of his classic The President: Office and Powers.'1 64 Corwin
repeatedly stressed the importance of the Militia Acts with respect to
"military power in law enforcement."' 65 Corwin was, however, just as
forceful-if not more so-in his contention that Neagle, along with Debs,
presupposed President Theodore Roosevelt's so-called "stewardship"
theory-that huge sources of emergency power inherently belonged to the
Executive. 166 Further, though Corwin discussed each of the Militia Acts and
even considered the effects of some of the changes in language, he never
drew out the specific implications of the 1807 Insurrection Act, nor did he
compare the statutory evolution to the development of doctrine in the
160. Id. at 98.
161. Id. at 99-100 ("Unmistakably the advantage lies with the earlier rather than the later
precedent.").
162. Id. at 102.
163. Id. at 103.
164. CORWIN, supra note 16.
165. Id. at 160, 160-70.
166. Id. at 182-93.
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courts.
167 Corwin did not reject the idea that the Militia Acts created broad
congressional emergency power that Congress had delegated to the
President-he largely overlooked it. In one key passage, Corwin
exacerbated the interpretive mistake he first made in his 1932 essay:
The President's powers in relation to martial law were first dealt
with by the Court during the Civil War, in the famous Prize Cases.
It was there held that the President, by virtue of his power as chief
executive and his power as Commander-in-Chief, was entitled to
treat a region known to be in insurrection as enemy country and
thereby strip all of its inhabitants of their constitutional rights. The
case thus ascribes to the President alone the power which in Luther
v. Borden is attributed to government as a whole ....
This conclusion is not wrong per se, but it misconstrues the Prize Cases
in a critical way-the President alone may have had such power, but not
because the Constitution gave it to him "by virtue of his power as chief
executive and his power as Commander-in-Chief." The Prize Cases
unequivocally held that this authority belonged to President Lincoln by
virtue of the 1795 and 1807 Militia Acts, and Corwin's construction to the
contrary helps to explain how, though he was well aware of the Acts, he
paid such little attention to their centrality to presidential emergency power
or to the specifics of any of the individual statutes.
Similarly, Charles Fairman, an even stronger proponent of broad
executive power during World War II-and, to his historical discredit, a
fairly strong supporter of President Franklin Roosevelt's authority to hold
Japanese Americans in internment camps 169-was also committed to a
flawed reading of the precedents. Fairman, who today is better known for
his canonical take on the question of extraterritorial constitutional rights,
170
wrote repeatedly throughout his career on martial law and emergency. 171 Of
most significance, however, is the second edition of The Law of Martial
Rule, which he published in 1943.72
In The Law of Martial Rule, Fairman reached a number of the same
conclusions as Corwin with respect to presidential authority and martial
167. Id. at 160-65, 174-75.
168. Id. at 174-75 (endnote omitted).
169. See Harry N. Scheiber & Jane L. Scheiber, Bayonets in Paradise: A Half-Century
Retrospect on Martial Law in Hawai'i, 1941-1946, 19 U. HAW. L. REv. 477, 533-34 (1997).
170. Charles Fairman, Some New Problems of the Constitution Following the Flag, I STAN.
L. REv. 587 (1949).
171. See, e.g., Charles Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule and the National Emergency, 55
HARv. L. REv. 1253 (1942); Charles Fairman, The Supreme Court on Military Jurisdiction:
Martial Rule in Hawaii and the Yamashita Case, 59 HARV. L. REv. 833 (1946).
172. FAIRMAN, supra note 16.
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law. In section 31 of his treatise, Fairman surveyed the Militia Acts and
their centrality to the constitutional allocation of the emergency war power
before moving on to the Prize Cases.173 Under his reading of the Civil War
decision, "the Court held that the decision of the President was not
reviewable, that by virtue of his proclamation war existed in a legal sense,
placing the inhabitants of the territory outside the constitutional
protections. ' 74 As he framed the issue that was before the Prize Cases
Court, "the Supreme Court had to... decide whether the President, in the
absence of any declaration by Congress, was competent to recognize the
existence of a state of war.'
75
Again, however, Fairman neglected to explain the derivation of
President Lincoln's authority. Fairman also separated his discussion of Mott
and Luther from his discussion of the Prize Cases176 and, in so doing,
neglected the consistency of the Court's emphasis of the Militia Acts when
discussing presidential emergency power.
Indeed, Fairman mentioned the Militia Acts on numerous occasions,
but he never really addressed their import-certainly not to the extent that
Corwin did. Instead, Fairman's project was more to survey the law of
martial rule, rather than to comment on the sources of authority thereto.
Where he concerned himself with the sources of such emergency power,
Fairman generally deferred to the Executive, without seizing on the Militia
Acts as an important source of authority, despite the Supreme Court's
statements in Mott, Luther, and the Prize Cases suggesting the opposite.
One (and perhaps the best) counterargument about the Prize Cases and
their role in supporting this Note's thesis was implicitly suggested by
Corwin 177 and explicitly highlighted by Farber, and merits consideration
here. As Professor Farber put it, "What was important was Lincoln's power,
without specific approval by Congress, to engage in what was in fact a
war.... The Framers understood the president to have the power to make
war in response to attack, though not necessarily to initiate it without
authorization from Congress."'178 Here, Farber refers to the debate at the
Philadelphia Convention about whether to give Congress the narrower
power to "declare war" or the broader power to "make war." 179 This
173. Id. § 31, at 118-21.
174. Id. § 31, at 119; see also supra note 129 and accompanying text (quoting and discussing
the passage from the Prize Cases on which Fairman relied).
175. FAIRMAN, supra note 16, § 31, at 119.
176. Compare id. § 31, at 119-20, with id. § 28, at 99-107 (discussing the other cases).
177. See CORWIN, supra note 16, at 174-75.
178. FARBER, supra note 3, at 141.
179. See Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886, 893 n.1 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting from
denial of motion for leave to file bill of complaint) ("The change from 'make' [war] to 'declare'
[war] was intended to authorize the President the power to repel sudden attacks .... ").
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argument, more about the defensive war power than about presidential
emergency power generally, draws support from the omission of "invasion"
from the 1807 Insurrection Act. But invasions are a very specific type of
threat. Leaving aside the inconsistencies in the reading of the Prize Cases,
the contention that the power to repel invasions is necessarily inherent in
Article II both ignores the plain language of the First Militia Clause and
also fails to provide any support for broader arguments about inherent
presidential authority during emergencies besides invasions.
Regardless, this lacuna concerning the constitutional source of the
defensive war power is merely a sidebar. It stands to reason that, were
there no statute authorizing presidential use of force to repel an invasion,
the Prize Cases might well be read for the proposition that the President
has an obligation to defend the nation that transcends separation-of-powers
concerns. But the power to repel invasions was not before the Prize Cases
Court-the Court was concerned only with the power to impose a
blockade, and the first critical passage of Justice Grier's opinion for the
Prize Cases Court indisputably holds that President Lincoln could act
without "specific" legislative approval not because of his independent
constitutional authority, but because broader congressional authorization
came from the Militia Acts.180
B. Steel Seizure, the Misunderstanding, and Emergency Power Today
All told, then, Corwin and Fairman, the two most prominent mid-
century scholars on presidential emergency power, discussed the Militia
Acts (Corwin extensively so), but both fundamentally and critically misread
the Prize Cases by focusing on the nature, and not the source, of the
authority the Court suggested President Lincoln properly possessed and
exercised. Because of the Prize Cases and Corwin's writings, one of two
things had (and has) to be true with respect to presidential authority to
impose martial law and to invoke the defensive war power: Either the entire
source of such power is the regime created by the Militia Acts, or, under the
stewardship theory, such power is "inherently" presidential, per cases like
Neagle and Debs. This is why the misreading of the Prize Cases is so
critical. But for the Prize Cases, it would be a fair reading of Neagle, Debs,
and their progeny that the President, as Chief Executive, has all forms of
inherent power essential to his office. But one of the key paragraphs from
the Prize Cases, though it is rarely cited, suggests precisely the contrary-
that the President has broad authority during emergencies, but that such
authority is most pointedly not "inherent."
180. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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This point is significant. Most scholars and courts writing after Corwin
and Fairman cited one or the other (or borrowed their conclusions without
attribution) for the proposition that the President has numerous forms of
inherent emergency power, sometimes even including powers explicitly
vested in the First Militia Clause.' 8 Because of the stewardship theory,
most writers since Corwin and Fairman have started their analysis of
emergency power from the perspective that it generally belongs to the
Executive and that Congress's authority to legislate about emergencies
must be construed in light of this constitutional "grant."
' 8 2
Following to its natural conclusion the argument of scholars who have
adopted the stewardship theory, except where Congress has specifically
provided statutory authority (and imposed limits) in certain classes of
emergencies-for example, via the National Emergencies Act (NEA),183 the
Stafford Act of 1974,184 the War Powers Resolution, 185 and other assorted
statutes186-or except where Congress has explicitly prohibited specific
presidential actions during emergencies, 87 the President's emergency
power should be generally unrestrained, falling, at bottom, into Justice
Jackson's "zone of twilight" from Steel Seizure.
1 88
But this understanding of presidential emergency power is simply not
reconcilable with Mott, Luther, and the Prize Cases, for it ignores the
contribution of the Militia Acts. Indeed, per Justice Jackson's delineation of
executive power in Steel Seizure, as reaffirmed by then-Justice Rehnquist in
181. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 7.
182. The best contemporary example is Judge Wesley's dissent from the Second Circuit's
recent decision in the Padilla case. For a discussion, see supra note 128.
183. Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-
1651 (2000)).
184. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-288, 88 Stat. 143 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
Importantly, the Stafford Act is a much broader grant of authority than what may first
appear. As Paul Schott Stevens writes, "[T]he statute even grants the president the authority to
utilize [the Department of Defense] on an emergency basis for 10 days prior to a presidential
declaration of a major disaster or emergency.... The president first must determine that the DOD
actions are necessary to preserve life and property." STEVENS, supra note 7, at 18 n.76 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 5170b(c)(1) (1994)).
185. War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1541-1548 (2000)).
186. For a summary of other relevant statutes, see STEVENS, supra note 7, at 17-19.
187. See, e.g., Non-Detention Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-128, § 1, 85 Stat. 347, 347
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000)). As I have recounted elsewhere, § 4001 was enacted as
much to repudiate Roosevelt's actions during World War II as it was to specifically repeal the
Emergency Detention Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, tit. II, 64 Stat. 987, 1019 (repealed 1971).
See Vladeck, supra note 13, at 178-80; Stephen I. Vladeck, Policy Comment, A Small Problem of
Precedent: 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (a) and the Detention of U.S. Citizen "Enemy Combatants," 112
YALE L.J. 961 (2003).
188. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
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Dames & Moore v. Regan,189 presidential emergency actions involving the
military at home are either pursuant to express congressional authorization
or they are a usurpation of Congress's emergency power. The former falls
into Jackson's first category, the zenith of presidential power;' 90 the latter
falls into the third category, where the President's power is "at its lowest
ebb."19' For courts attempting to analyze and assess presidential actions in a
crisis after the next emergency, this interpretive metric should be the
starting point.
Indeed, our contemporary regime of domestic emergency power, as
structurally preserved in the NEA, is predicated on specific statutes
authorizing the use of emergency powers, including those discussed above
and countless others. As section 201 of the NEA dictates, the President's
power to declare national emergencies is only "[w]ith respect to Acts of
Congress authorizing the exercise, during the period of a national
emergency, of any special or extraordinary power."1 92 The importance of
the Militia Acts, as presently codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-335, is that they
constitute a significant source of presidential emergency power that may be
invoked under the NEA, but one with little in the way of substantive
delineation. Their application and interpretation are largely up to the
presidents who resort to them.
CONCLUSION
But why does this matter? If Congress has delegated all of its authority
under the First Militia Clause to the President, as the Militia Acts clearly
suggest, why should contemporary scholars care about the constitutional
source of such power? The answer is that whatever power the President
currently possesses to declare and impose a state of martial law in an
emergency is ill defined-there would be few, if any, limits governing the
imposition of martial law in a true domestic emergency, as, for example, in
the hypothetical from The Siege that this Note opened with.
Indeed, as this Note has shown, it is manifestly unclear whether courts
could have any role in policing the actions of a future President in
189. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
190. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
191. Id. at 637-38. Importantly, congressional silence, normally an indicator for Jackson's
"zone of twilight," see id. at 637, would mean more in this context, given the extent of
congressional emergency delegations elsewhere in the field. Further, and this point bears
emphasizing, the focus here is on domestic emergency authority and not any adjunct of the foreign
affairs power. Justice Jackson highlighted this distinction as a key consideration in Steel Seizure,
see id. at 644, and contemporary courts have emphasized this point in distinguishing
extraterritorial presidential emergency actions from domestic ones, see, e.g., E1-Shifa Pharm.
Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
192. National Emergencies Act (NEA) § 201(a), 50 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (2000).
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responding to a serious crisis, and it is just as unclear what specific powers
the President has by virtue of the Militia Acts, what specific actions are
foreclosed to him, and where the gray area is with regard to triggers for
various levels of authority.
This Note's reading of the Militia Acts suggests that the President
would have broad authority to respond to a crisis (that it is his prerogative
to determine exists) by declaring martial law and suspending civil authority.
The lessons of history teach that if Congress is so inclined, it will
enthusiastically support the President, whether through its silence or
through affirmative ratification. But what if Congress disagrees? What if
Congress cannot assemble?193 What role for the courts then? Whether for
logistical or political reasons, it may be impossible for Congress to assert
itself forcefully (as the Militia Acts clearly suggest it could) after the next
emergency. The optimum solution to the vagaries of the current regime,
then, is a comprehensive update of the Militia Acts now.
Perhaps the early form of the Militia Acts, as discussed above, provides
a useful and usable paradigm for this kind of emergency power legislation.
Granting the President broad power, but only until Congress can
reassemble, is as reasonable as it is practical. As was the case during the
Whiskey Rebellion, requiring congressional reauthorization within thirty
days of the commencement of the next legislative session allowed for
coordination between the two branches and prevented resort to
extraordinary measures if the two disagreed. 194 No such checks exist today.
True, Milligan holds that martial law is available only where the courts are
closed or their process obstructed, but one means of accomplishing either is
to impose martial law itself. Who would be left to object?
If we assume, for the sake of argument, that explicit demarcation of the
authority the President may exercise in an emergency is a bad idea (because
the most dangerous crisis is the one whose contours no one expects),
general principles regarding time and scope can and should be derived from
the original emergency regime set up by the Second and Third Congresses.
To prevent potential excesses and abuses, some modification of the Militia
Act regime, as presently codified, is necessary. Such amendment could take
the form of an outright time limit on general executive action in response to
an emergency, once one is declared under the NEA, or it could be more
193. For a discussion of some of these concerns, see Howard M. Wasserman, The Trouble
with Shadow Government, 52 EMORY L.J. 281 (2003). See also Glenn E. Fuller, Note, The
National Emergency Dilemma: Balancing the Executive's Crisis Powers with the Need for
Accountability, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 1453 (1979).
194. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. Indeed, this kind of coordination is at the
heart of Professor Bruce Ackerman's broad proposal for a new framework emergency statute, see
Ackerman, Emergency Constitution, supra note 8, which would require increasing supermajorities
from Congress to sign off every so often on the continued exercise of "emergency" powers.
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specifically fitted to the type of emergency, distinguishing (as Canada
does,195 for example) between terrorism and natural disasters, war and
peace. In either event, the statutory regime unquestionably needs more
crystallization of the scope of each of the different levels of authority, and
the necessary triggers for each level.
As one commentator wrote in 2000, "The circumstances that would
prompt a declaration of martial law are so horrendous that they are almost
beyond contemplation. But that dreadful eventuality should not translate
into a lack of preparation, for if the nation is prepared, it is less likely to
fear even the most awful possibilities., 196 After September 11, with such
circumstances no longer "beyond contemplation," it is even more important
that such crisis authority have limits and that Congress reassert its
constitutional role-and, indeed, its obligation-in imposing them.
195. Emergencies Act, R.S.C., ch. 22, §§ 5-45 (Supp. IV 1985) (Can.).
196. Davies, supra note 2, at 112.
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